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Abstract
A society’s single emergent, increasing intelligence arises partly from the
thermodynamic advantages of networking the innate intelligence of dif-
ferent individuals, and partly from the accumulation of solved problems.
Economic growth is proportional to the square of the network entropy of
a society’s population times the network entropy of the number of the
society’s solved problems.
Keywords Economic growth, entropy, intelligence, language, networks, prob-
lem solving, society, thermodynamics.
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1 Introduction: The General Collective Prob-
lem Solving Capacity Hypothesis
In this article, I consider the effects of networking on the emergence of intel-
ligence in individuals and societies. The following hypothesis promotes and
sustains this investigation:
The General Collective Problem Solving Capacity Hypothesis. Society
possesses a general, collective problem solving capacity.
The General Collective Problem Solving Capacity Hypothesis implies that the
same general problem solving capacity that society uses, for example, to develop
language, is used to solve problems in mathematics, science, business, musical
composition and performance, sports contests, social interactions, politics and
daily life. “All life is problem solving” [47]; all problem solving is a strictly
analogous process.
Let’s adopt some notational conventions that will allow us to make the ob-
servations in the discussion that follows more precise. The formulas used in
the definitions are sometimes modified by a subscript relevant to the context in
which they are used.
Problem solving definitions.
1. {PS(t)}: a set of solved problems, as of time t.
2. {PSIndividual(t)}: the set of solved problems that have been learned by an
individual, or by a single problem solver in a network of problem solvers,
as of time t.
3. {PSAverage(t)} or {PSAv(t)}: the set of solved problems that have been
learned by the average individual in a society, as of time t.
4. {PSInnate(t)}: a theoretical construct, representing the set of solved prob-
lems that an individual, who did not have the benefit of any social net-
working or language, would know, as of time t. In past times, such an
individual, with the benefit of living in a familial group but with only a
rudimentary language, would be said to be living in a ‘state of nature,
or that imaginary state, which preceded society’ [30, Book III, Part II,
Section II, p. 501].
5. {PSSociety(t)}: the set of all of a society’s—a social network’s—solved
problems, as of time t.
6. {PSLang(t)}: the set of language problems solved by a society, as of time
t.
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7. {PSLex(t)}: the set of lexical problems solved by a society, as of time t.
8. Lex(t): the set of words in a lexicon, as of time t.
9. |Lex(t)|: the number of words in a lexicon, as of time t.
10. N(t) or |{PS(t)}|: the number of solved problems in a set {PS(t)}, as of
time t.
11. |Tot|: the total number of problems, solved and unsolved, as of time t.
12. r: a percentage rate of increase per decade in the number of solved prob-
lems for some set of solved problems {PS(t)}. For a single period of time,
∆t,
r =
d|{PS(t)}|
dt
=
(
|{PS(t2)}| − |{PS(t1)}|
|{PS(t1)}|
)
× 100%,
(1)
or
r =
dN(t)
dt
=
(
N(t2)−N(t1)
N(t1)
)
× 100%.
(2)
13. m : a percentage rate such that
m =
d|{PSInnate(t)}|
dt
. (3)
14. ∆t from year t1 to year t2 is the number of decades, (t2 − t1)/10, the
number of thousands of years, (t2 − t1)/1, 000, or the number of years, as
indicated by the context.
The hypothesis raises the
General Collective Problem Solving Capacity Problem. Is there any
way to prove The General Collective Problem Solving Capacity Hypothesis—
that is, to show that the same problem solving capacity of a society is used to
solve all types of problems?
We want to find a common attribute of different kinds of collectively solved
problems that will demonstrate that society has a general, collective, problem
solving capacity. Any such attribute should be objectively measurable; otherwise
objective comparison is not possible. To narrow our scope of inquiry into what
the common attribute might be, we consider how to characterize a problem
solving capacity.
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If Society A solves twice as many problems in a year as Society B, Society A
has demonstrated, literally, twice the problem solving capacity—solved problem
productivity—of Society B. Let a subscript A indicate a set of solved problems
pertaining to Society A and let a subscript B indicate indicate a set of solved
problems pertaining to Society B. Here, we consider the increase,
|{PS(t2)}A| − |{PS(t1)}A| = ∆(|{PS}A|) (4)
over a period of time, in the existing number of solved problems for a Society
A, as indicative of Society A’s problem solving capacity. If the number of a
society’s solved problems remained unchanging from one year to the next, then
that society would not have a problem solving capacity, just an unchanging store
of solved problems.
Suppose, in hypothetical circumstances, that the population of a human
society is unvarying—constant—and that the proportion of the population that
are problem solvers in the society is constant. Then, even if the number of
problem solvers affects a society’s solved problem output, in these circumstance
the number of problem solvers is not a factor. If Society A has k times the
problem solving capacity of Society B during the same period of time, then,
adapting (4),
∆ (|{PS}A|) = k ×∆(|{PS}B|) . (5)
The ratio between the left and right sides of (5), of the number of problems
solved in two different societies during the same period of time, is maintained
for the rate at which problems are solved, that is,
d|{PS}A|
dt
= k ×
d|{PS}B|
dt
. (6)
If society has a general problem solving rate, then if its general problem
solving rate results in increasing the number of solved problems of one kind,
then the number of solved problems of all other kinds should also increase at
the same rate. If we can identify different kinds of general collective problems for
which the problem solving rates are the same, then we have evidence in favor
of—and consistent with—the existence of society’s general collective problem
solving capacity.
In light of the foregoing discussion, we have found one possible common
attribute that we can use to test our hypothesis that society has a general
collective problem solving capacity: the rate of collective problem solving.
2 The plausibility of a general collective rate of
problem solving
2.1 General considerations
Suppose the capacity of any individual to solve any particular kind of problem
is an instance of that individual’s general problem solving capacity. Then one
A theory of intelligence 6
can infer that the same applies to society, that is, that the capacity of a soci-
ety to solve a particular kind of collective problem is an instance of society’s
general collective problem solving capacity. For if individuals apply the same
average amount of energy to solve an average problem, then society collectively
will apply the same average cumulative amount of energy to solve an average
collective problem.
There is accepted evidence that implies that individuals use the same av-
erage amount of energy to solve the average problem—that individuals have a
general problem solving capacity—that is characterized by experts in the field
of intelligence testing as a general intellectual proficiency. The
“tendency shared by most individuals to perform many different in-
tellectual tasks at about the same level of proficiency . . . has been
demonstrated repeatedly in statistical analyses of the interrelation-
ships of performances on tests measuring different intellectual func-
tions . . . ” [35, p. 22].
What has been demonstrated for individuals necessarily applies with greater
force to society. In a society, differences in the problem solving capacities of
individuals—for some the capacity is higher, and for others the capacity is lower,
than average—offset each other. The larger the sample of problem solvers, the
more likely it is that the average amount of energy spent by the average in-
dividual problem solver in solving an average problem is a good estimate of
the society’s average amount of energy spent per individual solving the average
problem. Then, for collective problems, the cumulative amount of energy re-
quired should be the same for different kinds of problems. This is a consequence
of The Law of Large Numbers when applied to the number of problem solvers.
The larger the sample of problem solvers, the more likely it is that the estimated
average individual problem solving capacity equals the actual average individual
problem solving capacity for the entire society:
“. . . as the number of observations increases, so the probability in-
creases of obtaining the true ratio between the number of cases in
which some event can happen and not happen, such that this prob-
ability may eventually exceed any given degree of certainty” [4, p.
328].
In principle, it should be possible to estimate the actual amount of energy used
by the average problem solver to solve the average problem, from the point of
view of the problem solvers.
The second reason why using average problems as data is likely to reveal
society’s average collective problem solving rate involves the thermodynamics
of problem solving.
If it requires a certain amount of energy to solve a problem, then to solve a
set of problems requires a certain total amount of energy. If we assume that the
number of problems solved by a society is proportional to the average amount
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of energy used to solve each problem, then—considering a solved problem as
equivalent to information—
energy input ∝ information output. (7)
If we denote the quantity of information for Subject # 1 by (Information)1,
and the amount of energy used to create that information by (Energy)1, and
similarly for Subject # 2, the proportionality of information and energy may be
expressed as
(Information)2
(Information)1
=
(Energy)2
(Energy)1
. (8)
We might put it this way: Sets of solved problems containing the same amount
of information required the same amount of energy to solve them. If
(Information)k = (Information)j (9)
for sets of information, then
(Energy)k = (Energy)j , (10)
for all j and k, where (9) holds.
The equivalence of ratios in (8) resembles the form of the relationship be-
tween heat and absolute temperature in thermodynamics,
Q2
Q1
=
T2
T1
, (11)
where, in an ideal heat engine,
• Q2 represents an amount of heat from a heat source added to the heat
engine’s working substance,
• T2 represents the absolute (higher) temperature of that heat source,
• Q1 represents the amount of heat removed from the heat engine’s working
substance and added to the engine’s heat sink, and
• T1 represents the (lower) absolute temperature of the heat sink.
(A good account of the ideal heat engine is in [17, Ch. 44, Vol. 1].)
If the average problem solver has an average general problem solving capac-
ity, then it must be that the same energy input can achieve, regardless of the
nature of the problem, the same quantity of information output. That would
imply that the analogy of the equality in (8) to the equality in (11) is exact.
Whether society has an average general collective problem solving capacity is
equivalent to asking whether (8) is true for different kinds of information ob-
tained by general collective problem solving.
If a society as a whole confronts a particular problem, the society is more
efficient if it diverts its problem solving energy resources to solving that problem
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only until the payoff—the benefit of obtaining a solved problem—for the energy
required to solve the problem matches the payoff for alternative uses of society’s
problem solving energy resources. If a society is adaptive, the competition
among problems for the society’s finite problem solving energy resources should
result in the same average level of solved problem productivity for different kinds
of collective problems that have the same information output.
New solutions of problems, and improvements in existing solutions, are in-
ventions—conceptual inventions—by problem solvers. Problems that confront
society compete for society’s problem solving energy resources. Kenneth Arrow
remarked that
“Invention is here interpreted broadly as the production of knowl-
edge. From the viewpoint of welfare economics, the determination
of optimal resource allocation for invention will depend on the tech-
nological characteristics of the invention process and the nature of
the market for knowledge” [2].
Society collectively determines the ‘optimal resource allocation’ for the solving
of its problems—how to allocate its resources to create knowledge.
The efficiency criterion for the allocation of problem solving resources im-
plies that problem solving outputs for different kinds of problems should be, on
average, proportional to their energy inputs, as in (8). In principle, there should
exist an average amount of energy per average general collective problem, from
the point of view of the collective problems.
Since the number of solved problems is finite and in principle, enumerable,
we can number the solved problems sequentially, using 1, 2, 3, . . . , N(t); the
subscript i pertains to a problem’s assigned number. Each solved problem,
(PS)i required a finite number ξi of energy units ǫ to solve it; a standard
energy unit, ǫ, is selected so that when we add up the total amount of energy
required to solve all N(t) solved problems, the total amount of energy is
N(t)∑
i=1
ξiǫ = N(t)ǫ. (12)
The average energy per solved problem is
∑N(t1)
i=1 ξiǫ
N(t1)
=
N(t1)ǫ
N(t1)
= ǫ. (13)
Therefore, if there are a finite number of solved problems which each re-
quired a finite amount of energy to solve, then it must be possible in principle
to calculate the average amount of energy that was required to solve the average
problem. For there to be the possibility of calculating an average, it is neces-
sary that the total number of solved problems, and the total amount of energy
required to solve them, both be finite. A human society and its store of solved
problems satisfy those requirements.
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Human beings, for example, consume a finite amount of food, which supplies
a finite amount of energy, during their lifetime. If (1) the average person con-
sumes 2000 calories per day, (2) the proportion of daily calorie intake devoted
to problem solving is known, and (3) if the number of problems solved over a
period of time is known, then the average amount of energy used to solve the av-
erage problem could in principle be calculated. Similarly, the average amount of
energy used to transmit the average amount of information from one individual
directly to another could, in principle, be calculated.
All of these considerations imply that it is plausible that a society has a
general collective problem solving rate.
2.2 Analogical generalizations
A model that successfully describes general collective problem solving for hu-
man societies should apply as well to general collective problem solving by
other animal societies; general collective problem solving by human societies is
a paradigm for general collective problem solving for all societies of animals.
Studying collective problem solving in human societies has advantages over
studying problem solving in other animal societies. Statistics about changes
in problem solving capacities and economic productivity are more numerous
and more available for societies of human beings than for societies of other
animals.
We can study the emergence of general collective problem solving in human
societies,
• as an analogy for emergent networked processes generally,
• as a paradigm for networked problem solving in animal societies, and
• as a phenomenon consistent with the concepts and theories of thermody-
namics.
3 Estimating a problem solving rate
3.1 Rate estimation
In this section, we consider some aspects of finding a problem solving rate. We
assume that in principle it is possible to enumerate all solved problems that an
individual has learned, or that a society has accumulated in a store of solved
problems, leaving aside the difficult problem of what counts as a single solved
problem.
The output of a problem solving capacity consists of solved problems. When
society successfully applies its problem solving capacity to solve a problem,
society increases the number of already solved problems. If the number of solved
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problems increases linearly, then for any number of decades in the period of time,
∆t,
|{PS(t2)}| = |{PS(t1)}|+
(
d |{PS(t1)}|
dt
×∆t× |{PS(t1)}|
)
=
(
1 +
[
d |{PS(t1)}|
dt
×∆t
])
× |{PS(t1)}| .
(14)
If the number of problems increases exponentially, then for any period of
time ∆t,
|{PS(t2)}| =
(
1 +
d |{PS(t1)}|
dt
)∆t
× |{PS(t1)}| , (15)
or, having regard for the definition of r in (2),
|{PS(t2)}| = (1 + r)
∆t × |{PS(t1)}| . (16)
Like interest accruing on principal, the number of newly solved problems
increases the total number of solved problems exponentially. If the accumulation
of solved problems is analogous to the accumulation of interest, then it is likelier
that (15) and (16) rather than (14) characterize the way that solved problems
accumulate.
If we know the number of solved problems at an earlier year t1 and also
at a later year t2, it is possible to calculate the average rate r per decade, of
exponential growth in the number of society’s solved problems, by solving for r
in
N(t2) = N(t1) exp(r ·∆t). (17)
Then, from (17), with |{PS(t1)}| = N(t1) and |{PS(t2)}| = N(t2),
r =
(
ln
[
N(t2)
N(t1)
])
÷∆t. (18)
(18) suggests three kinds of data can be used to determine society’s average rate
per decade of collective problem solving r:
• Data that has measured r itself, or a related rate equal to r;
• Data that has measured N(t1) and N(t2) for some set of solved problems,
which allows us to find the logarithm of their ratio as in (18), and to solve
for r; or
• Data that gives the ratio
N(t2)
N(t1)
(19)
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but not the values of N(t1) and N(t2) separately, which allows us to solve
for r in (18).
With the rate per decade r determined directly as in (18) when the values of
N(t1) and N(t2) are known, or indirectly when only the ratio set out in (19) is
known, we can calculate the average rate of increase r in the number of solved
problems per decade. If, using data for different kinds of solved problems, we
calculate the same rate r for them, we will have obtained evidence favoring the
validity of the hypothesis that society has a general collective problem solving
rate. The closer that the values of the rates for the different kinds of solved
problems are to each other, the more persuasive such evidence is.
This is a refinement of the possible common attribute, the rate of general
collective problem solving, for testing The General Collective Problem Solving
Capacity Hypothesis. We can test not just whether the rates coincide, but we can
impose a tougher test of whether exponential rates coincide over an extended
period of time. If rates for two different kinds of problem solving are both
exponential, but the functions describing each differ, the gap between the two
rates would likely increase over time. If the functions coincide over a long period
of time, the hypothesis has passed a sterner test.
As a consequence of The Law of Large Numbers, and from (19), it appears
that when N(t1) and N(t2) are large, we will have more confidence that when
their ratio in (19) is used to solve for r in (18), we will obtain an estimate rEst
that is close to society’s actual average general problem solving rate, rAct.
3.2 Error estimation
Suppose that we have estimates of both N(t1) and N(t2), and that we use the
equation in (18) to estimate r. How accurate is rEst as an estimate of the rate
r?
By assuming the existence of an actual rate, rAct, we can show that the
longer the time period ∆t used for estimating that actual average rate, the
closer rEst is to rAct, all other things being equal.
Suppose rAct and ∆t = (t2 − t1) are given, and that [N(t1)]Act is the actual
value of N(t1). Let
[N(t2)]Act (20)
be the actual number of solved problems at year t2. Let rEst be an estimate of
society’s problem solving rate, and let [N(t2)]Est be an estimate of the number
of solved problems at year t2. If we use an estimated average rate, rEst, to
estimate [N(t2)]Act based on [N(t1)]Act, then, applying (17),
[N(t2)]Est = [N(t1)]Act exp(rEst ·∆t). (21)
Let
∆N2 = [N(t2)]Est − [N(t2)]Act . (22)
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Here ∆N2 is the error in the estimate of the size of [N(t2)]Act resulting from
using an inaccurate rEst applied to [N(t1)]Act to obtain a value for [N(t2)]Est
as an estimate of [N(t2)]Act. Taking the ratio [N(t2)]Est to [N(t2)]Act reveals
that a longer time period reduces the amount of error in rEst. For, applying
(21),
[N(t2)]Est
[N(t2)]Act
=
[N(t2)]Act +∆N2
[N(t2)]Act
=
[N(t1)]Act exp(rEst ·∆t)
[N(t1)]Act exp(rAct ·∆t)
=
exp(rEst ·∆t)
exp(rAct ·∆t)
= exp((rEst − rAct) ·∆t).
(23)
Taking, in (23), the logarithm of the right side of the first line and the logarithm
of the last line, we find that
ln
(
[N(t2)]Act +∆N2
[N(t2)]Act
)
= (rEst − rAct) ·∆t. (24)
From (24), the error in the estimate of rAct resulting from using rEst to
estimate [N(t2)]Act is
rEst − rAct =
[
ln
(
1 +
∆N2
[N(t2)]Act
)]
÷∆t. (25)
The error in an estimate of rAct becomes smaller as ∆t increases (and also as
∆N2 decreases). In percentage terms, the error is
rEst − rAct
rAct
× 100%. (26)
As an example of the effect of the number of decades on an error in esti-
mating rAct, suppose the actual number of solved problems [N(t2)]Act is known
for a year t2 which is 33.2 decades later than t1. If [N(t2)]Est is 10% higher
than [N(t2)]Act as a result of imperfect data—∆N2 is 10% of [N(t2)]Act—an
actual rate of problem solving of .0341 (3.41%), for example, per decade will be
estimated to be higher by about
rEst − rAct =
[
ln
(
(1.1) [N(t2)]Act
[N(t2)]Act
)]
÷∆t
= [ln(1.1)] /33.2
= 0.002871.
(27)
The error 0.002871 as a proportion of rAct , which we here suppose to be 3.41%
per decade, would therefore be
0.002871÷ .0341 = .08418, (28)
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or about 8.4 percent. If [N(t2)]Est =1.1× [N(t2)]Act—if [N(t2)]Est is 10% too
high an estimate—over a period of 332 years, the estimated average rate per
decade, rEst, would be 3.41% + 0.2871% = 3.6971% per decade, about 8.4%
more than the actual value of 3.41% per decade used in this example. If the
span of time was 839 years—83.9 decades—then a 10% error in [N(t2)]Est would
result in an error in the estimate of rAct of about 3.33%. If the span of time
was 3,742 years—374.2 decades—then a 10% error in [N(t2)]Est would result in
an error in the estimate of rAct of .007469, which is less than three quarters of
one percent. The results of error calculations when [N(t2)]Est is 10% too high
are summarized in Table 1.
Number of years Size of error in %
100 27.9
332 8.418
839 3.33
3742 0.7469
Table 1: Percentage error in rEst due to [N(t2)]Est being 10% too high.
If [N(t2)]Est = 0.9× [N(t2)]Act—if [N(t2)]Est is 10% too low an estimate—
over a period of years, we can do a similar set of calculations leading to the
results in Table 2.
Number of years Size of error in %
100 30.9
332 9.3
839 3.6
3742 0.826
Table 2: Percentage error in rEst due to [N(t2)]Est being 10% too low.
If the error in the number of problems at year t2 is less than 10%, whether
high or low, then the size of the errors in Tables 1 and 2 would be even less.
This discussion suggests that, all other factors being equal, a rate estimated by
using a longer period of time is more reliable. Similar calculations apply to
determining the effect of an error in estimating [N(t1)]Act—the actual number
of solved problems at year t1.
This error analysis suggests preferring data consisting of a large number of
problems evaluated by a large number of people over a long period of time,
to improve the accuracy of our estimate of society’s average general collective
problem solving rate.
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4 Testing the general collective problem solv-
ing capacity hypothesis: required attributes
of data
4.1 Kinds of data
One possible way of estimating society’s average, general, collective problem
solving capacity—society’s average, general, collective problem solving rate—is
to identify a kind of solved problem that can be counted, and to then calculate
the problem solving rate as described in subsection 3.1.
For a collection of solved problems to qualify as general collectively solved
problems they must be intrinsically an accomplishment of society acting as a
single problem solving entity. The total number, per year, of books published,
words printed, things invented or manufactured, might be representative of the
problem solving output capacity of a society. A language is a good example
of a set of solved problems that involves all of society. The development of
language is intrinsically an accomplishment of a society. A language is a col-
lective, emergent phenomenon. It is, in its essence, a network phenomenon—a
medium for transmitting information within a network. To use language as a
way of testing society’s general collective problem solving productivity requires
us to identify a feature of language that consists of a countable subset of solved
language problems, with data available for different points of time in order to
estimate the problem solving rate.
By comparing the cumulative number of solved problems for one kind of
solved problem as of two different years, we convert the problem of measuring the
implicit energy content of a set of solved problems to one of finding a countable
feature of a particular set of solved problems. What counts as a separately
solved problem? We need to find a set of solved problems where the criteria
for deciding what counts as a solved problem are relatively consistent and easy
to determine. It would be most helpful if we could identify a set of already
compiled and counted solved problems.
Suppose it is possible to enumerate a set of solved problems. Suppose that, at
an earlier year t1, a society has an accumulated store of N(t1) solved problems,
where
N(t1) = |{PSSociety(t1)}|. (29)
To test the statement implied by (8)—the amount of information is propor-
tional to the amount of energy used to create that information—we need to
numerically compare the implicit energy contents of different bodies of informa-
tion. To compare their implicit energy contents, we need to assign a number to
their respective amounts of information. Since it is difficult to compare differ-
ent kinds of problem solving, such as lexical problem solving and mathematical
problem solving, by means of a common criterion, we seek statistics that cor-
respond to the amount of information for the same kind of problem solving at
different points in time.
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Another possible way of estimating society’s average, general, collective
problem solving rate might be to use a statistic that is, indirectly, equivalent to
it. We will explore that possibility in this section as well. Examples of statistics
about averages that might be useful are the average test scores of individuals in
IQ testing, and the average economic productivity of individuals in a society.
We will gain confidence in the correctness of our hypothesis that society has
a general collective problem solving capacity if we find similar general collective
problem solving rates for different kinds of general collective problems. The
closer the rates are to each other, and the longer the period of time during which
they are close to each other, the more confidence we will have. We therefore seek
representative statistics to measure society’s average general collective problem
solving rate. In this section, we will consider the criteria for choosing such
data. First we consider the evaluative nature of society’s general, collective—
and enumerable—problem solving rate. Then we consider how it is possible to
use statistics about an average individual problem solving rate for comparison
to society’s general collective problem solving rate.
4.2 Economic growth data
Economic statistics are a possible source of evidence about society’s general col-
lective problem solving rate. If society’s store of solved problems increases, then
economic growth should also increase. If a society’s general collective problem
solving capacity results in an increase of the number of its solved problems,
that should improve the economic well-being of its citizens. We might put it
this way:
Applying a problem solving capacity ⇒ the number of solved problems increases,
and
the number of solved problems increases ⇒ the economy grows.
This chain of inference suggests that individual intelligence and economic
growth are related, since society’s general collective problem solving capacity is
the networked general problem solving capacity of its individual citizens.
Individual intelligence—both learned and innovative problem solving—is
used to develop and to evaluate a society’s improved and new technologies.
Economists infer that improvements in technology enable economic growth [48].
Since improvements in technology derive from the application of the problem
solving capacities of individuals and of society to increase the productivity of
some process, then so do improvements in the economy. Increasing society’s
intelligence—its general collective problem solving capacity—should increase
economic growth. If we can improve our understanding of intelligence, then
we may improve our understanding of how society’s general collective problem
solving capacity leads to economic growth.
Intelligence and economic growth are also related in another way: both
are the product of emergent processes. A brain’s networked neurons manifest
themselves as one single mind. Similarly, society’s—a social network’s—
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“dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowl-
edge which all separate individuals possess” [27, p. 77]
leads, in an economy, to a market solution that
“might have been arrived at by one single mind possessing all the
information” [27, p. 86].
Individual intelligence and the development of a market economy are both
emergent processes. In emergence, disparate but networked parts arrange them-
selves to have a capacity that none of the parts individually has. If we can
improve our understanding of how networking plays a role in the emergence of
individual intelligence, we may improve our understanding, by analogy, of how
markets and collective intelligence emerge. So, for economists, there are at least
two reasons to study the nature of intelligence: first, to relate intelligence to
economic growth, and second, because how individual and collective intelligence
emerge may provide an analog for how markets emerge.
4.3 The evaluative nature of collective problem solving
If we decide to use enumeration as the way to estimate r, then the type of solved
problem that is the object of our investigation must have a definite solution
that is discrete and countable. Problems concerned with political and social
interactions often do not qualify as discrete and countable. In contrast, problems
in a mathematics test, or inventions invented during a period of time, qualify
as being discrete, countable, and capable of being identified as being solved.
Society, mostly, does not collectively invent new technologies like new light
bulb designs. There are too few technological problems confronted by too few
individuals who, as inventors, have problem solving capacities that are too un-
representative of the average person, for us to consider most technological in-
novations and inventions as indicative of society’s average general collective
problem solving rate. It must be the case that society’s average general collec-
tive problem solving rate measures the rate at which members of society solve
evaluative problems. Even for language, which is a communication technology
for a social network, created through the solved problem contributions of many
individuals, evaluation plays a prominent role.
For a word, society’s evaluative consensus is required before it becomes part
of the lexicon. A new word presents word users with these problems: is this
new word useful, convenient, efficient, and an improvement on the available al-
ternatives, so that it is worth the effort required to learn it? For a consumer
product, the consumer’s problem is not, how can I invent this? The consumer’s
problems are instead: is this more useful, convenient and efficient than available
alternatives? should I buy this? For a new scientific theory, a scientist’s prob-
lems include: should I accept this new theory and adjust my research, texts,
and teaching accordingly [33]. Legislators must solve evaluative problems such
as, does this proposed legislation remediate a social, economic, or political issue
without itself causing harm? if passed, will this legislation be viewed favorably
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by my constituency? Jurists must solve problems that include: which solution
is consistent with existing legal principles? which possible solution best resolves
the legal issue involving the parties? which resolution is consistent with an
appropriate remedy? Society must also evaluate how to best receive, store, re-
trieve, process, transmit and record solved problems. We infer that society’s
general collective problem solving is evaluative. If a varied or new idea does not
pass society’s evaluative muster, for most practical purposes, it has no effect. If
no one pays attention to an idea, the idea might as well not exist.
Consider encoding a computer software program into computer code as
analogous to encoding abstractions into words. Computer software continu-
ally improves as the result of the efforts of thousands of computer software
engineers. Language, analogously, also continually improves, but emergently,
and over much longer periods of time involving all of a society; language is a
large-scale, open source,1 software engineering project.
Just as energy is spent to devise computer software, so also is energy spent
to improve language.
For an ensemble of independent systems which are uniformly random, James
Clerk Maxwell, Ludwig Boltzmann and J. Willard Gibbs showed in the late
1800s that the statistically most likely state is one in which the same average
amount of energy occupies equal volumes. By analogy, the same amount of
energy being required to solve the average problem is a statistically more likely
state. Considering the distribution of energy among solved problems, which each
required the same average amount of energy to solve, is analogous to considering
the distribution of energy among equally sized ‘volume elements’ [6, p. 50] or
‘region elements’ [45, p. 124] in statistical mechanics.
To demonstrate that the same amount of energy is required to solve any kind
of average problem, as distinguished from specialized non-collective problems,
we need to use, as data, evaluative problems that any person in society can solve,
and which are evaluated by many people. It should not matter what the nature
of the problem is, or who the particular problem solver is. Specialized problem
solving will not reveal society’s average general collective problem solving rate.
If we successfully choose as data average collectively solved problems, there is
an increased likelihood that society’s average general collective problem solving
rate will be revealed. This increased likelihood arises for the reasons set out in
Section 2.
Society evaluating the merits of a proposed solution to a given collective
problem is equivalent to networking the individual evaluations of all members
of society. If a large number of people contemporaneously evaluate the merit
of a proposed solution to a given problem, and if each person solves several
sub-problems in such an evaluation, then N(t), the total number of such solved
problems, is large. Just as, in recording the results of a large number of flips of
a coin, we expect the ratio of heads to tails to better reflect the true proportion
of the chance of heads compared to the chance of tails, so we expect that a large
number of solved evaluative problems produced by a large number of people will
1‘Open source’ is an observation of Michael Shour, Toronto.
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better enable us to estimate society’s actual average general collective problem
solving rate.
Therefore, measurement of society’s average general rate to solve evaluative
problems can help test the hypothesis that a society has an average general,
collective, problem solving capacity.
4.4 When an average of individual rates coincides with a
collective rate
4.4.1 Problem solving in IQ tests
Statistics about average IQ test scores are available. IQ tests are normalized by
the producers of IQ tests—adjusted so that the average IQ of a contemporaneous
reference group is at all times 100. The rate of change in the normalization has
been measured. Therefore, it is possible to measure the rate at which average
IQs increase by comparing normalizations of average IQ test results for IQ tests
administered at earlier times to average IQ test results for IQ tests administered
at later times. We look at IQ tests because they are a particular instance of
indirectly measuring an average individual general problem solving rate. Since
some statistics about average IQs are available, the rate at which average IQs
increase can be compared to society’s average general, collective problem solving
rate in other areas, such as lexical growth and lighting efficiency.
An IQ test has a standardized set of test questions, designed to measure
an individual’s problem solving capacity for different kinds of problems, to
be completed over a prescribed amount of time. The IQ test has two fixed
variables—the test questions and the amount of time to complete them—out
of three. The third variable, the number of correctly solved problems |{PS}|
out of the total number of problems |Tot|, helps determine the IQ test scores of
each person because both sets, {PS} and the set of problems included in |Tot|,
are enumerable—can be counted. The proportion,
|{PS}|
|Tot|
, (30)
can be measured and compared to a contemporaneous standardized average
proportion of problems correctly solved by a reference group of people who
have taken the test. The test, having sampled an individual’s problem solving
capacity by questions designed to test different kinds of problem solving skills,
indirectly and in part, estimates (we infer), for the person tested, the proportion
of society’s knowledge—the proportion of solved problems—that the person has
learned.
An individual’s problem solving capacity is applied to, among other kinds
of problems, the problem of how to learn society’s solved problems—how to
acquire information from other individuals by socially networking with them,
and from society’s store of solved problems. If, consistent with The General
Collective Problem Solving Capacity Hypothesis, an individual’s problem solving
capacity is a general capacity, it follows that the rate at which an individual
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learns society’s solved problems is approximately equal to the person’s general
problem solving rate. Therefore, measuring what a person has learned is an
indirect way of measuring an individual’s general problem solving rate. If a
person’s problem solving rate is positive, then, if it is consistently applied, the
person’s own store of solved problems, acquired to a large extent by learning
society’s solved problems, should increase.
If the intelligence of a person is equivalent to the person’s general problem
solving capacity, then if an IQ test estimates the person’s general intelligence,
it at the same time measures the person’s general problem solving capacity. If
an IQ test is an accurate estimate of a person’s intelligence, then informally we
might speak of ‘a person’s IQ’ as if we are speaking of that person’s intelligence.
But an IQ test, even in this informal sense, is only an estimate of the person’s
‘actual IQ.’
An IQ test result, as expressed in (30), is analogous to society’ collective
production of solved problems. Society faces, in a given period of time, some
total number of problems, |Tot|, some portion of which—the set of solved prob-
lems in {PS}—are solved during that period of time. An individual’s general
problem solving capacity is therefore analogous to society’s general collective
problem solving capacity. If society’s store of solved problems—its knowledge—
increases, individual general problem solving capacity should increase.
IQ researchers reason that it is not a change in the biology of human beings
that leads to the increase in average IQs that has been measured by them in the
past few decades. The human brain could not evolve that quickly. Moreover, if
intelligence increased that rapidly, then, extrapolating back in time, that would
imply that the geniuses in the past, say 2000 years ago, achieved the results
they did with meager intellectual resources, insufficient to accomplish what they
did. It is therefore unlikely that the average innate, or basal, problem solving
capacity of individuals has changed much over the past two or three thousand
years. This has left researchers suggesting TV, diet, education, and so on, as
possible factors that might explain why average IQs have been increasing.
Suppose that every person has an innate, or basal, general problem solv-
ing capacity. The innate, or basal, general problem solving capacity must be
positive, otherwise it would not be possible for a person to figure out how to
learn and remember the solution to a problem solved by other people—to learn
information.
The few hundred problems that comprise an IQ test approximately measure
the general problem solving skill of an individual. An individual’s problem
solving skill includes two components. One component depends on how well
the person has learned the society’s solved problems: how much knowledge the
person has acquired from the social network and from society’s store of solved
problems. Another component depends on how much innate, or basal, problem
solving capacity a person has—a capacity they were born with—to retrieve
learned knowledge from that person’s own memory and to process that learned
knowledge—to vary, adapt and invent solutions to problems novel to the person
using that knowledge. Comparing the average IQ for a group of people over a
period of time measures a society’s general collective problem solving rate by
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indirectly measuring the average rate at which the effectiveness of society’s store
of solved problems has increased, for all those individuals who have learned those
solved problems. If the quality of society’s store of solved problems increases,
the store of information of the socially networked individual should improve in
proportion.
4.4.2 The average IQ and society’s IQ
In this part we try to demonstrate that the rate of increase in the average
person’s general problem solving rate equals the rate of increase in society’s
average general collective problem solving rate. It would follow that the rate of
increase of average IQs and the rate of increase of society’s collective IQ should
be equal. If that is so, we can validly use the rate of change in a society’s average
IQ as a means of estimating society’s general, collective problem solving rate.
First, we wish to demonstrate, with reference to IQs, that an average of a
society’s individual rates of problem solving is equivalent to the society’s general
collective problem solving rate, in principle.
We will use the following additional definitions, some of which are analogous
to the problem solving definitions which begin on page 3.
IQ Definitions.
1. IQIndividual(t): the IQ—intelligence—of an individual, as of time t.
2. IQAv(t): the average IQ—intelligence—of a set of individuals, as of time
t.
3. IQInnate(t): a theoretical construct, representing what an individual’s IQ
would be without any social networking or language, as of time t.
4. IQInnate−Av(t): a theoretical construct, representing what the average
individual’s IQ would be without any social networking or language, as of
time t.
5. {NetworkingIndividual(t)}: the set of solved problems of an individual
that relate to social networking, as of time t.
6. f(Pop(t)): a function of the population of a society, as of time t.
7. g(|{PSSociety(t)}|): a function of the number of a society’s solved prob-
lems, as of time t.
8. [C(Pop)(t)] or [C(Pop)]: a proportion, between 0 and 1, of f(Pop), as of
time t.
9. [C(PSSociety)(t)]: a proportion, between 0 and 1, of g(|PSSociety(t)|), as
of time t.
10. For both [C(Pop)(t)] and [C(PSSociety)(t)], subscripts Individual and,
for the average ‘C’ value for a group of individuals, Av, are also used.
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11. S −Pop(Ind): the base of the logarithmic function that measures part of
the capacity of an individual to socially network.
12. S − PS(Ind): the base of the logarithmic function that measures part of
the capacity of an individual to network with solved problems.
The individual IQ. In this first step, we relate an individual’s IQ to its
component factors.
Some proportion of IQIndividual(t) is based on the person’s innate problem
solving capacity—the problem solving capacity of a person determined by the
person’s genetically inherited, physiological capacity, IQInnate(t). That is,
IQIndividual(t) ∝ IQInnate(t). (31)
IQIndividual(t) is also proportional to a function of |{PSIndividual(t)}|, the
amount of society’s information—the number of solved problems that the indi-
vidual has learned. The more an individual knows, the higher their working,
individual IQ. The relationship between an individual’s IQ and a function of
the number of solved problems learned is linear. This must be the case for the
following thermodynamic reasons.
An individual, during their life, expends energy in an approximately linear
way, proportional to time.
(∆ time)Individual ∝ (∆ energy)Individual. (32)
An individual, has the capacity to add to their existing personal store, or
set, of solved problems, {PSIndividual(t)}, proportioned to the energy used by
them to acquire—learn—those solved problems, as follows:
(∆ energy)Individual ∝ ∆g(|{PSIndividual}|). (33)
From (33), we infer
d [(energy)Individual] ∝ d [g(|{PSIndividual}|)] . (34)
The more that an individual knows—the more solved problems that the
individual has learned—the more resources the individual has to use to solve
newly encountered problems. So
∆g(|{PSIndividual}|) ∝ ∆(IQIndividual). (35)
Since an individual’s use of energy is proportional to the advance of time,
and the number of society’s solved problems acquired by an individual is pro-
portional to the energy used to learn them, it follows that the increase in an
individual’s store of solved problems is proportional to time. That implies that
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an individual’s IQ increases linearly along with the linear increase in a func-
tion of the number of solved problems that the individual has learned. Hence,
similarly to (35),
IQIndividual(t) ∝ g(|{PSSociety(t)}|). (36)
The portion of society’s solved problems acquired—learned—by an individ-
ual is only a proportion of a function of all of society’s solved problems. That
is,
g(|{PSIndividual(t)}|) ∝ g({|PSSociety(t)}|), (37)
or
g(|{PSIndividual(t)}|) = [C(PSSociety)(t)]Individual × g(|{PSSociety(t)}|), (38)
where [C(PSSociety)(t)]Individual—the ‘C’ factor—represents the proportion of
a function of all of society’s solved problems. So, combining (36) and (38),
IQIndividual(t) ∝ [C(PSSociety)(t)]Individual × g(|{PSSociety(t)}|). (39)
A solution to a problem that was solved by society can contain the solution to a
problem that confronts an individual, or can help solve the individual’s problem
by analogy or by other methods.
From (31) and (39), it follows that, without regard to the effect of social
networking,
IQIndividual(t) ∝ IQInnate(t)× [C(PSSociety)(t)]Individual
× g(|{PSSociety(t)}|).
(40)
Learned solved problems as a factor in IQ. (40) implies that an individ-
ual’s capacity to solve problems, which is represented by IQIndividual(t) on the
left side of (40), arises from the individual applying their innate IQ to learn a
portion—a subset—of the problems that society has solved.
As to the innate IQ factor on the right side of (40), the physiology and
capacity of the average human brain has likely not changed much if at all over the
past few thousand years. If a person’s problem solving capacity is proportional
to the physiological capacity of their brain, then it follows that the innate, or
basal, problem solving capacity of the human brain—and the average individual
innate IQ—has likewise remained unchanged over the past few thousand years.
Therefore, we assume that, at least in the recent past of human beings,
d [IQInnate(t)]
dt
= 0. (41)
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Based on all of these considerations, it must be that any rate of change in
the number of solved problems that an individual learns is a result of applying
IQInnate to increase their store of solved problems.
Since
IQIndividual =
d|{PSIndividual}|
dt
, (42)
we interpret (40) as demonstrating that an individual IQ test score is one pos-
sible metric for measuring the problem solving capacity, or IQ, of an individual
that arises when an individual’s innate, or basal, problem solving capacity, or
innate IQ, is applied to a subset of society’s solved problems. An individual’s
innate, or basal, problem solving capacity, or innate IQ, is also involved in solv-
ing the problem of how to learn that subset of society’s solved problems. An
individual’s store of solved problems cannot increase without the individual ap-
plying their innate, or basal, problem solving capacity; without an individual
invoking their innate, or basal, problem solving capacity, the individual’s store
of solved problems remains static. (40) suggests that the innate IQ on the right
side of (40), as an invented, notional, metric, measures, at least partly, an indi-
vidual’s problem solving capacity, which is equivalent to the processing part of
the left side of (40).
This relationship is analogous to a relationship in thermodynamics, between
energy and absolute temperature. Absolute temperature is an invented metric—
and is not a function of time—such that the absolute temperature is, for a given
closed system, proportional to the system’s heat energy. If the heat energy in the
system doubles, the absolute temperature doubles. By measuring the absolute
temperature, one can indirectly measure any increase in the given system’s heat
energy content. The ratio of heat energy to absolute temperature for a given
closed system is its entropy, which can be described as the ratio
Q/T = η
= logS(W ),
(43)
whereQ is the heat energy of the system, η, the small Greek letter eta, represents
the entropy of the system, S is the base of the logarithmic function, T is the
absolute temperature of the system, and W can be considered to be the state of
the system, or the number of individual energy components in the system [45,
p. 118, for example]. (There is a constant k that multiplies logS(W ), but we
will suppress that for now, as if k = 1.)
Absolute temperature, as a source for our analogy, and an individual IQ
test score, as a target of an analogy, does not work exactly. As was mentioned
above, the standard IQ test score, based on a metric of 100 as the average
IQ, is adjusted over time; the standard average 100 IQ is not absolute. In the
target of our analogy, for a given individual and also for the average individual,
the number of solved problems per IQ point increases over time, while for a
given thermodynamic system, the amount of energy per degree of temperature
is unchanging.
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The problem solving capacity of an individual as it is measured by an IQ
test score is affected by education—how much the individual has learned, as
implied by (40). If, having regard for (40), we treat problem solving work as
being the result of an individual applying IQInnate using what the individual
has learned, then if we want to focus on a problem solving capacity of an indi-
vidual without the enhancement of education, we should use the theoretical, or
notional, unchanging IQInnate of an individual as a metric of that individual’s
problem solving capacity, analogous to absolute temperature as a metric of heat
content for a given system.
For an individual, IQInnate is unchanging during their life, and so, for that
individual, is analogous to absolute temperature, which is an unchanging metric
for a thermodynamic system. Similarly, IQInnate−Av for a set of people—the
average innate IQ for that set of people—is similarly an unchanging metric for
their average problem solving capacity, or rate. If the average innate IQ has
remained relatively constant over the past few thousand years, then it may be
considered to be more analogous to the idea of absolute temperature than is
individual (composite) IQ which changes, and as well, is partly a function of
what a person learns. The idea of an innate IQ is entirely theoretical, because
it would be difficult in practice to isolate a person’s innate problem solving
capacity from what the person has learned.
Let’s consider how an innate problem solving capacity of an individual inter-
acts with a network of solved problems. To simplify our analysis, and consistent
with the foregoing, we first assume that this occurs in the absence of a social
network. By way of an approximate analogy to (43),
d |{PSIndividual(t)}|
dt
≡ Q (44)
(the change in information is analogous to energy, because new information is
created by the input of energy, and because as the number of solved problems
increases, the problem solving rate increases),
IQInnate(t) ≡ T (45)
(the invented IQ metric, but at the level of the notional IQInnate, is analogous
to absolute temperature), and
d |{PSIndividual(t)}|
dt
/IQInnate(t)
= η
= logS−PS(Ind)(|{PSIndividual(t)}|),
(46)
(as in (43), forming an analog to a definition of entropy used in thermodynam-
ics), where the base of the logarithm, S−PS(Ind), is applicable, for a particular
individual, to a network of solved problems—what might called a network of
abstractions or ideas.
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From (46), and multiplying the left and right sides by IQInnate(t), we have
d |{PSIndividual(t)}|
dt
= IQInnate(t)
× logS−PS(Ind)×(|{PSIndividual(t)}|).
(47)
The rate of change, on the right side of (47), in the number of solved prob-
lems learned by a problem solving individual, arising from the application of
an individual’s innate IQ, is equal to the individual’s composite intelligence,
IQIndividual(t), since, for the left side of (47),
d |{PSIndividual(t)}|
dt
= IQIndividual(t). (48)
It follows from (40) and (48), now having regard for the proportion C(PS)
of logS−PS(|{PSSociety(t)}|) that an individual knows, that
d |{PSIndividual(t)}|
dt
= IQInnate(t)
× [C(PSSociety)(t)]Individual
× logS−PS(|{PSSociety(t)}|).
(49)
In the second and third lines in (49), [C(PSSociety)(t)] and |{PSSociety(t)}|
likely change over the course of a person’s lifetime. |{PSSociety(t)}| changes as
the result of collective problem solving; [C(PSSociety(Ind))(t)] can change as a
result of additional energy spent by an individual in learning solved problems—
increasing the proportion of society’s solved problems that the individual has
learned.
The factor
[C(PSSociety(t))]Individual × logS−PS(|{PSSociety(t)}|) (50)
in (49) exactly corresponds to the general form that entropy takes in thermo-
dynamics, C × logS(n).
The situation represented by (49) is a theoretical, or notional, one in which
individuals have direct access to a store of society’s solved problems, but without
any social networking.
The implication of (49) is that the factor set out in (50) multiplies innate
IQ, and as well, that the more ‘solved problem’ targets an individual’s innate
IQ can network with, the more ‘intelligent’ that individual will be.
Social networking as a factor in IQ. We now consider the effect of so-
cial networking on IQIndividual(t), an individual’s IQ. For the purposes of this
article, I accept as true the following observations:
A theory of intelligence 26
“As the child negotiates the early developmental levels through
countless emotional exchanges with her caregiver, she develops an
implicit understanding of her society’s attitudes towards beliefs and
social practices, norms and values, power hierarchies and the kinship
system, and so on [24, p. 325].
. . . it is the pattern of reciprocal, co-regulated affective interac-
tions in the early stages of development that helps the child differen-
tiate her own individual personality and helps the group determine
its collective personality” [24, p. 332].
How to socially network is a problem solving exercise, beginning with an
individual’s earliest childhood moments. Each ‘emotional exchange’ requires
each party to the exchange to solve the problem of how to participate in that
exchange. A child has to decipher her caregiver’s signals, and has to solve the
problem of how to signal back to the caregiver. ‘All life is problem solving.’
Analogous to the way that we considered the thermodynamics of how an
individual networks with a society’s solved problems and abstractions, let’s con-
sider how an individual networks with other individuals in their society—how
the individual solves the problem of how to socially network—but ignoring, for
now, society’s network of solved problems. We can infer that the capacity of
an individual to socially network is analogous to their capacity to solve social
networking problems. We can consider the set of individuals with whom a given
individual networks, or equivalently, the set of solved problems, corresponding to
‘solved’ problems that establish social relationships, {NetworkingIndividual(t)},
to consist of a population connected, directly and indirectly, to an individual.
That is
{NetworkingIndividual(t)} = {PopIndividual(t)} . (51)
|{PopIndividual(t)}| represents the person’s social network. Since an individ-
ual must solve problems of how to network with other individuals, by analogy
to (46),
d |{PSNetworking(t)}|
dt
/IQInnate(t)
= η
= logS−Pop(ind)(|{PopIndividual(t)}|).
(52)
By analogy to (49)
d |{NetworkingIndividual(t)}|
dt
= IQInnate(t)× [C(Pop)(t)]Individual × logS−Pop(Pop(t)),
(53)
where S − Pop is the base of the logarithmic function applicable for the whole
society.
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In light of (40), and since an individual’s social network arises from the
application of IQInnate, any rate of change that a person experiences in their
social network ultimately is a result of applying IQInnate to the problems of how
to socially network with other individuals. It must be therefore, that, similarly
to (48),
d |{NetworkingIndividual(t)}|
dt
∝ IQIndividual(t). (54)
The situation described by (53) is a theoretical, or notional, one in which
individuals socially network, but do not network with solved problems.
The factor
[C(Pop)(t)]Individual × logS−Pop(Pop(t)) (55)
in (53) also corresponds to C × logS(n), the general form that entropy takes in
thermodynamics.
Now we suppose that an individual can contemporaneously network with
other individuals, a situation described by (53), and with a set of solved prob-
lems, a situation described by (49). If we blend together the two situations
described by (49) and (53), we obtain a combined formula that describes indi-
vidual intelligence, as follows:
d |{PSIndividual(t)}|
dt
= IQIndividual(t)
= IQInnate(t)
× [C(PSSociety)(t)]Individual × logS−PS(|{PSSociety(t)}|)
× [C(Pop)(t)]Individual × logS−Pop(Pop(t)).
(56)
The three components, or factors, of an individual’s IQ in (56), appear to
be:
• the individual’s innate IQ;
• a function of the individual’s knowledge;
• a function of the individual’s social network.
There is likely a fourth factor that affects individual intelligence, represented
by the combined effect of the environment, culture and infrastructure, to the
extent not already subsumed within the three components just mentioned.
With respect to (56) the population (Pop(t)) of a society can be estimated.
It is possible, if The General Collective Problem Solving Capacity Hypothesis
is valid, to estimate the number of solved problems |{PSSociety(t)}| by finding
an enumerated set of collectively solved problems proportional to that number.
That leaves us with the problems of measuring, for an individual, the other
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four parameters in (56), namely C and S for each of society’s population and
its solved problems. [C(PSSociety)(t)]Individual represents that proportion of
society’s solved problems that an individual has ‘networked’ with. S − PS,
the base of the logarithm of the number of society’s solved problems, must
have some thermodynamic relationship to society’s store of solved problems
due to its relationship to entropy. [C(Pop)(t)]Individual may represent how
well an individual is socially networked, or how adept at social networking an
individual is. S − Pop, the base of the logarithm of society’s population, must
also have some thermodynamic relationship to society’s population. These four
parameters, the two C’s and the two S’s in (56), may be difficult to measure
for an individual, but they have been measured as averages for nodes in some
networks.
Later in this article we discuss the problem of how to characterize and mea-
sure the following four parameters in (56):
• [C(PSSociety)(t)]Individual
• S − PS
• [C(Pop)(t)]Individual
• S − Pop.
Average IQs. We can evaluate the rate of change in the average individual
IQ in terms of its component factors, by using (56).
Let the subscript i in the following be used to identify the different individ-
uals comprising the society under consideration. For a society consisting of n
individuals, the average of the society’s individual IQs is:
IQAv =
∑n
i=1 [IQindividual]i
n
. (57)
To simplify notation for the next equation, let the following represent the
indicated values, all at a common time t.
• [C(PSSoc)]i: the proportion of the number society’s store of solved prob-
lems learned by individual i;
• | {PSSoc} |: the number of society’s store of solved problems;
• [S − PS](i): the base of the logarithm for the logarithmic function of the
number of society’s solved problems, for individual i;
• [C(Pop)]i: the proportion of the society’s network connected to individual
i;
• Pop: the population of the society;
• [S−Pop](i): the base of the logarithm for the logarithmic function of the
society’s population, for individual i.
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Using this notation, and combining the results of (56) and (57), we obtain,
letting the subscript Av represent the average for the society’s individuals, at a
time t,
IQAv(t) =
∑n
i=1 [IQIndividual]i
n
= [
n∑
i=1
[IQInnate]i
× [C(PSSoc)]i × log[S−PS](i)(|{PSSociety}|)
× [C(Pop)]i × log[S−Pop](i)(Pop)]
×
1
n
.
(58)
We infer that the averaged values of the two Cs and Ss that help determine
the IQ of the average individual in a society are related to the Cs and Ss
with the subscript i that apply to individuals in (58). Consistent with our
hypothesis about the way a general problem solving capacity works, the same
general problem solving capacity applied to learning society’s problems should
apply to solving problems of how to socially network. Consistent with The
General Collective Problem Solving Capacity Hypothesis, each component factor
in (58) achieves its average value in a similar way. In other words, the average
of the product on the right side of (58) should equal the product of the averages.
So we infer, based on (58), that, at a time t
IQAv =
∑n
i=1 [IQIndividual]i
n
=
∑n
i=1 [IQInnate]i
n
× [C(PSSoc)]Av × log[S−PS](Av)(|{PSSociety}|)
× [C(Pop)]Av × log[S−Pop](Av)(Pop)
= [IQInnate]Av
× [C(PSSoc)]Av × log[S−PS](Av)(|{PSSociety}|)
× [C(Pop)]Av × log[S−Pop](Av)(Pop).
(59)
(59) should apply for any rate of population growth, including a rate of zero
population growth. For the past few thousand years, a human being’s genetically
endowed problem solving capacities have been unchanged, which implies that
the average innate, or basal, IQ has been unchanged during that period of time,
consistent with (41). If we take the derivative with respect to time of the left
side of (59)—average IQ—for a period in which there is no population growth,
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and of the product on the right side of (59), we have
d [IQAv(t)]
dt
= [IQInnate]Av
×
d
(
[C(PSSoc)]Av × logS−PS(Av)(|{PSSociety}|)
)
dt
,
(60)
because IQInnate, as in (41), does not change.
In other words, (60) predicts that the average rate at which average IQs
increase, for a period during which the population size is relatively unchang-
ing, should equal the average innate IQ times the average rate at which the
logarithmic function—the entropy—of an enumerated set of collectively solved
problems increases.
Society’s IQ Analogously to the situation of an individual, a society’s IQ is
proportional to its store of solved problems, considering society as if it were one
(networked) individual having a ‘single mind’ in itself:
IQSociety ∝ g(|{PSSociety}|). (61)
Not all solved problems in a society are perfectly networked, but only a
proportion, C(PSSoc). That is,
IQSociety ∝ C(PSSoc)× g(|{PSSociety}|). (62)
If we take the derivative with respect to time of the left and right sides of
(62), then we have
d [IQSociety]
dt
∝
d
(
[C(PSSoc)]× logS−PS(|{PSSociety}|)
)
dt
. (63)
The proportion C(PSSoc) for the whole society equals C(PSSoc)Av. Simi-
larly, for the whole society, [S − PS] = [S − PS]Av. Therefore,
d [IQSociety]
dt
= [IQInnate]Av
×
d
(
[C(PSSoc)]Av × logS−PS(Av)(|{PSSociety}|)
)
dt
.
(64)
The right side in (64) equals the right side in (60), and so,
d [IQSociety]
dt
=
d [IQAv(t)]
dt
. (65)
Another way of obtaining the result in (65) is to observe that society’s IQ—
its problem solving capacity—consists of the unnetworked average problem solv-
ing capacities of its individual members, times C(Pop)× logS−Pop(Pop). So
IQSociety(t) = IQAv(t)× C(Pop)× logS−Pop(Pop). (66)
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If we substitute into (66) the value of IQAv from (59), and take the derivative
of the left and right sides, for a society in which there is no population growth,
we obtain the result in (65).
One implication of (66) is that if society’s intelligence increases, then average
IQs will increase in proportion, or,
IQSociety ր =⇒ IQAverage ր . (67)
If average IQs increase, that necessarily implies that for most everyone in society,
IQSociety ր =⇒ IQIndividual ր . (68)
The problem solving capacity of an individual in a society is greater than
the problem solving capacity of the individual without that society, an obser-
vation implicit in (59). The more people there are, the more problem solving
resources there are: more memory and more processing power. Society has more
networked neurons than an individual does. How much greater are the problem
solving resources of society than those of the average individual?
We have demonstrated in (65)
Society’s IQ Theorem. The rate of growth in society’s collective IQ equals
the rate of growth in the average individual IQ.
Society’s IQ Theorem allows us to obtain a rate for society’s general collective
problem solving rate by using statistics about the rate of change in average
individual IQs.
The general problem solving capacity of a person is analogous to the general,
collective problem solving capacity of society.
5 Data, calculations and measurements for the
general problem solving capacity hypothesis
I propose to use three sources of data to estimate society’s average general col-
lective problem solving rate: the rate of increase in average IQs, the size of the
English lexicon, and the improvement in lighting efficiency. In these data, the
proportion of the total population involved in, or measured for, their, evalua-
tive problem solving, and the number of problems solved, should both be large
enough to permit us to reasonably estimate society’s average general collective
problem solving rate. Because of the range and generality of problems posed
respectively in IQ tests, in evaluating words in the lexicon, and in evaluating
lighting improvements, I infer that each of the three kinds of data enable mea-
surements of the rate of solving problems that are representative of society’s
general collective problem solving rate.
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5.1 Increasing average IQs
The first set of data we consider concerns the rate at which average IQs increase.
“Reed Tuddenham was the first to present convincing evidence using
a nation-wide sample”[19, p. 2]
that average IQs are increasing. In this part, we use the average rate of increase
in average IQs as determined by IQ researchers. The average rate of increase in
average IQs is equal to the average rate of increase in society’s IQ, by reason of
Society’s IQ Theorem, giving us a statistic that measures the average general
collective problem solving rate.
The rate of a society’s increase in average IQs is estimated by comparing
average IQ test scores at different times. The average increase in IQ test scores
based on compared average IQ test scores, on a standardized basis, for the
United States from 1947 to 2002, is 0.300 to 0.363 IQ points per year [19, p.
113 and Table 1 at p. 180]. The research results describe a linear rate of increase
of 3.00 to 3.63 IQ points per decade. Since the cumulative number of society’s
solved problems should in principle grow exponentially over time, and since it
is difficult to distinguish the difference between a linear rate of growth and an
exponential rate of growth when the growth rate is slow over a short period of
time, which is the case for this average IQs data, I infer that the rate of increase
in average IQs must be exponential.
Since a 100 IQ is the mean, we can infer that the exponential rate of increase
in average IQ test scores is about 3.00% to 3.63% per decade; the midpoint of
those rates is about 3.315% per decade. The 0.63 difference between the high
and low measurements of the rate of increase in average IQs is about 17.35% of
the higher measurement of 3.63% per decade. This spread in measurement is less
than, but consistent with, the descriptions of the percentage errors, summarized
in Tables 1 and 2, that can arise due to a 10% error in estimating N(t2) over a
short period of time, such as a period of several decades. Still, we can consider
this estimate, 3.315% per decade, as set out in Table 3, to be an approximation
of the actual rate at which average IQs increase.
Years The average rate of increase in average IQs
1945–2002 3.315% per decade
Table 3: The estimated average rate of increase in average IQs.
5.2 Language, and its lexical growth rates
If The General Collective Problem Solving Capacity Hypothesis—the hypothesis
that society possesses a general problem solving capacity—is valid, then the rate
at which a society solves language problems in particular, should be the same
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as the society’s general collective problem solving rate. Which is to say that it
would be the case that
d|{PSLang(t)}|
dt
=
d|{PSSociety(t)}|
dt
. (69)
Language is also a medium that helps solve problems that can be expressed
conceptually—by using abstractions. Since language helps solve problems, lan-
guage must improve some aspect of the process of problem solving that leads to
an increase in the number of solved problems; otherwise language would not play
such a prominent role in human society. How quantitatively important is lan-
guage’s role in human problem solving? How much more intelligent is a human
being with language than without it? are questions that follow from considering
these aspects of language.
To use language in problem solving requires identifying, manipulating and
combining appropriate abstractions. An abstraction encoded by sound, that
quickly communicates danger or opportunity over distances, around corners and
in the dark, is useful. Combining different sounds increases society’s capacity
to encode different abstractions. If there are too many sounds, though, it would
impede learning them all.
Words, as reified concepts, can be metaphorically manipulated: we ‘make’
and ‘build’ arguments, and ‘construct’ theories. Manipulating worded abstrac-
tions to solve a problem conceptually is analogical to manipulating physical
objects—solving the problem physically—if the abstractions accurately encode
and model the corresponding real world phenomena. Since manipulation of
physical objects is familiar to people, manipulation of words—things represented
by encoded abstractions—becomes familiar by a kind of analogy: the relation-
ship between things is modeled by the relationship between the corresponding
abstractions.
Since language increases a person’s problem solving capacity, which is benefi-
cial for society, society continuously seeks ways to make language more efficient.
Language itself encompasses different kinds of problems that require solving.
If The General Collective Problem Solving Capacity Hypothesis applies to lan-
guage problems, the different kinds of language problems should themselves be
solved at the same collective rate.
Members of society continuously, collectively, solve language problems that
include:
1. How should society invent, choose and improve a set of sounds for encoding
abstractions?
2. Which phenomena can be abstracted?
3. Which phenomena, for which abstraction is possible, are useful to ab-
stract?
4. How, using the chosen set of sounds, should the chosen phenomena be
encoded?
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5. How efficient is an abstraction?
6. How efficient are procedures for organizing abstractions, such as rules of
grammar?
7. Which words and language procedures, such as rules of grammar, should
be improved, preserved or discarded?
The current state of a language stores society’s solutions to these language
problems.
Solved language problems are an information resource for the society speak-
ing the language. Solved language problems are an emergent infrastructure of
encoded abstractions that assists in solving new language problems, by analogy,
variation, combination, and (adopting the term used by Fauconnier and Turner
in [13]) blending, all created by networked individuals over many generations.
The lexicon of a language improves by increasing the depth of words—
increasing the amount of information a word connotes—and by increasing the
range of words—adding new words to the lexicon.
Increasing the depth of words and grouped words is analogous to increasing
the amount of information in a transmitted signal by compressing the encoded
data. In language, information compression is achieved in various ways, by nam-
ing, by using abbreviations, initials, shortening the length of words—for exam-
ple, from ‘internetwork’ to ‘internet’—and by using allusive words and phrases
to which the society’s culture and general knowledge supply additional infor-
mation. Examples of allusive compression are ‘WWII’ and ‘personal computer.’
A similar kind of allusive compression of abstraction is exhibited by mathe-
matical notation, such as the symbol for integration, ‘
∫
,’ and by mathematical
conventions, such as the order in which binary operations are performed.
If society can increase the level of compression of information in words—
increase the depth of words—the effect on the capacity of individuals and their
societies to solve problems should be, over time, dramatic. If ten compressed
words contain twice as much information as their ten predecessor words, then
the problem solver can now manipulate twice as much information as before,
in the same amount of time. The problem solver’s problem solving capacity
with respect to the manipulation of those encoded abstractions has increased
(logarithmically with respect to those ten words).2 Since the lifetime of a person
is finite, society’s capacity to increase the depth of words increases the amount of
information that can be manipulated within the same amount of time and with
the same amount of effort, and can, and I believe does, increase the problem
solving capacity of an individual.
It is difficult to devise a way to measure the effect of increasing compression
on the efficiency of language. The General Collective Problem Solving Capac-
ity Hypothesis implies, however, that if we find some other feature of language
2That is, by a factor of logS(2), when the 10 predecessor words are compared to the 10,
twice as compressed, successor words.
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that is enumerable, then the rate of increase in that enumerable language fea-
ture should correspond to the rate at which compression improves the depth of
abstractions in a lexicon.
A second category of language problems can be considered to result in the
increase of the range of a lexicon, or the number of words in a language. I am
not sure how the rate of change in the depth of words could be directly measured
but as to the range of words, we can count words in a dictionary. I propose
to consider, as a proxy for the measurement of the increasing compression—the
increasing depth—of language, the increasing range of words in a lexicon. The
range of words in a language is the number of words, and the number of words
in a lexicon is a countable feature of a language.
If The General Collective Problem Solving Capacity Hypothesis is valid, a
society’s average lexical growth rate should, in principle, equal the rate of in-
crease in the depth of compression of words. The average rate of increase in
the depth and range of words should equal the society’s average language prob-
lem solving rate; a society’s average language problem solving rate should, in
principle, equal the society’s average general collective problem solving rate—
society’s problem solving capacity—because The General Collective Problem
Solving Capacity Hypothesis implies that all these equalities hold.
In effect,
{PSDepth} ⊂ {PSLex} , (70)
{PSRange} ⊂ {PSLex} , (71)
and
{PSLex} ⊂ {PSLang} ⊂ {PSSociety} . (72)
It would follow that, for language,
d |{PSDepth}|
dt
=
d |{PSRange}|
dt
=
d |{PSLex}|
dt
(73)
and
d |Lex(t)|
dt
=
d|{PSLang(t)}|
dt
=
d|{PSSociety(t)}|
dt
.
(74)
We have converted the vague problem of finding the average general collective
problem solving capacity of society to one of finding a representative problem
solving rate—an average lexical growth rate. If average problem solving rates
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for society’s other general collective problems coincide with the average lexical
growth rate, then we will have evidence that society has an average general col-
lective problem solving rate—and hence, an average, general collective problem
solving capacity.
The second set of data we consider in this section concerns average English
lexical growth. For the English lexicon, I use the number of words in the 1989
Oxford English dictionary, and data from two University of Toronto (U of T)
historical dictionary projects, to estimate the size of the English lexicon for
different years. To find society’s average general collective problem solving rate
requires the use of (18). We wish to show that the English lexicon grows at the
same rate as English society’s average general collective problem solving rate,
because the number of problems solved in the lexicon is proportional to the
number of general collective problems solved by society, that is,
Lex(t) = K(t)× [PSEnglish Society(t)] , (75)
where K(t) represents the proportion. It is possible that K(t) could vary over
time.
A lexicon results from thousands, perhaps millions of people, over many gen-
erations, solving evaluative problems about the convenience of the components
of language, and about the efficiency of the networking of such components.
Thus we have a large group of people confronted daily with lexical problems,
and a large problem set, including the problems of devising, refining, evaluat-
ing and improving the set of sounds to be used for encoding, how to encode
abstractions into words, how to group words into more complex abstractions,
and how to store the accumulation of encoding solutions. The components of
language, including the lexicon, are a much larger sampling of a society’s aver-
age, general, collectively solved problems than are the questions on an IQ test.
Almost everyone in society, a larger group of people than those few who take
IQ tests and those fewer who design them, is involved in teaching, learning, and
providing feedback about the efficiency—convenience—of words and language.
With respect to the English lexicon, the daily evaluation by millions of people
of thousands of words is more frequent then the occasional, if ever, evaluation
of the problem solving capacity of those people by IQ testing. The English lex-
icon provides a larger set of solved problems, that have been evaluated by more
people, more frequently, over a historically longer period of time, than IQ tests.
What counts as a word requires a professional judgment. Likely, the OED
and U of T’s two historical English dictionary projects, relied on in this part, use
relatively consistent criteria for what counts as a word. We make the necessary
assumption that the criteria for what counts as a word are similar for U of
T’s Old English project, U of T’s Early Modern English Dictionaries Database
(EMEDD), and the OED. Historical dictionaries may miss words that were used
in speech but not recorded; that may be partly counter-balanced by inclusion
in a dictionary of words rarely used. For data, I use three sources for English
lexical data.
The first source of English lexical data is the University of Toronto’s partly
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completed Old English Dictionary [62]. It covers the period of Old English,
from the year 600 to the year 1150. Eight of 22 Old English letters, up to the
letter g, have been completed.3 Based on, and extrapolating from the total of
12,271 words for the 8 completed letters—the dictionary counts æ as a separate
letter—and assuming the same average number of words per letter, I estimate
34,020 words in Old English for the whole Old English alphabet of 22 letters.
If the number of words per letter for the next, uncompleted, 14 letters of the
Old English alphabet is different than the average number of words for the
dictionary’s first eight letters, then the estimate may be slightly in error. If the
estimate of the average number of words per letter, based on the first 8 letters,
is valid, it is likelier that the estimate of the total number of words is low rather
than high; a dictionary that ends in the year 1150 omits Old English words that
were used but never written down.
The most complete previous compilation of Old English words is An Anglo-
Saxon and English Dictionary [8], which has a 1921 supplement [57], revised
in 1972 [7], and covers the period 450 to 1100. Likely, H. Gneuss relies on An
Anglo-Saxon and English Dictionary for his estimate of about 30,000 recorded
Old English words,“although there must be gaps . . . ” [22].4
The second source of English lexical data is another University of Toronto
project, the Early Modern English Dictionaries Database [63]. Information
about it can be found on the internet. As of 1999, when the EMEDD project
concluded, it had about 200,000 word-entries to the year 1657. It is not unlikely
that the EMEDD omits some words never recorded. On the other hand, some
words in the EMEDD had “foreign language headwords, and some headwords
were repeated.”5 I suspect that the number of repeated words in the EMEDD
would be fewer than one percent, which would be a sizeable error of 2,000
words. Having regard for the error analysis in Tables 1 and 2, the EMEDD
likely provides a reasonable estimate of the size of the lexicon at 1657.
The third source of English lexical data is the 1989 Oxford English Dictio-
nary (OED), which has a total of 616,500 word-forms [65]. Having regard for
(18), we define N(t1), N(t2), N(t3) for the English lexicon at 1150, 1657, and
1989 as set out in Table 4. Using Table 4, (∆t)1 = (t3−t1) and (∆t)2 = (t3−t2).
We solve for r over the two time periods, (∆t)1 and (∆t)2, using (18), with the
results set out in Table 5.
An Old English dictionary has the disadvantage and advantage of a long
distance in time before the present. Since an Old English dictionary deals with
words for a period before the development of the printing press, there are fewer
written sources for words than for later periods of time—a disadvantage. The
longer period of time from the Old English endpoint of 1150 to 1989, on the
other hand, would, all other things being equal, likely result in a smaller degree
of error in estimating an English lexical growth rate.
3at December 2008
4Dr. Oliver M. Traxel of the University of Muenster referred me to Gneuss’s article in
September 2005.
5November 26, 2008 personal communication by email from Professor Ian Lancashire of
the University of Toronto.
A theory of intelligence 38
i N(ti) Year Lexicon Size
1 N(t1) 1150 34,020
2 N(t2) 1657 200,000
3 N(t3) 1989 616,500
Table 4: Estimated English lexicon sizes.
Using the historical English dictionaries, the estimated average English lex-
ical growth rate for the period from 1150 to 1989 is about 3.453% per decade,
and from 1657 to 1989 about 3.391% per decade. As shown by the error cal-
culations in Table 1, even if one of N(t1), N(t2), N(t3) were inconsistent in
counting words leading to a 10% over count, for example, the estimate of the
rate per decade for 1150 to 1989 would only be in error by about 3.33% and for
1657 to 1989, by about 8.9%. Both estimates, 3.391% per decade and 3.453%
per decade, are close to the estimated average rate of increase in average IQs,
which is about 3.315% per decade. The estimated English lexical growth rate
results are summarized in Table 5.
Time period Average English lexical growth rate per decade
1150 to 1989 3.453%
1657 to 1989 3.391%
Table 5: The estimated average English lexical growth rate.
5.3 Lighting efficiency
The third set of data we consider concerns the average rate of increase in lighting
efficiency.
The lighting efficiency data is from a study by Professor Nordhaus [41] about
the change in lighting efficiency from 1,750 B.C.E. to the year 1992. To deter-
mine the average rate of increase in lighting efficiency it is necessary to solve
for r using the ratio set out in (19). The improvement in lighting efficiency
required the evaluation, by many people, of the convenience of many different
lighting innovations, over a period of 3,742 years, longer than the period of time
considered for English lexical growth, and much longer than the several decades
of data about increasing average IQs. Since domestic lighting is a widely used
technology, involving so many members of society, in their various roles as in-
ventors, manufacturers, and wholesale and retail purchasers, and as users of
lighting, it is likely that the problem solving required by the evaluation of light-
ing technology and improvements is representative of society’s average general,
collective problem solving capacity. Improvements in the depth of ideas may
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also have facilitated improvements in the technology of lighting.
Nordhaus studied lighting efficiency to test whether price indexes accurately
capture improvements in the material well-being of people arising from improved
technologies. One of the bases of comparison he uses is what he calls the ‘labor
price of lighting,’ measured in hours of work required to pay for 1000 lumen
hours, lumen being a measure of illumination. For example, Nordhaus estimated
that a sesame lamp in Babylonia around 1750 B.C.E. cost about 41.5 hours
of work per 1000 lumen hours, and that in 1992 a compact fluorescent light
cost 0.000119 hours of work per 1000 lumen hours. If The General Collective
Problem Solving Capacity Theorem is valid, then the improvement in lighting
efficiency should equal the rate of improvement in lexical efficiency, which we
have estimated using English lexical growth.
We can use (19) to find the relative increase in the efficiency of lighting from
1750 B.C.E. to 1992. It is
41.5
.000119
= 348, 739.5. (76)
As Nordhaus writes,
“an hour’s work today will buy about 350,000 times as much illu-
mination as could be bought in early Babylonia [41, p. 33, Cowles
Paper].”
In (76) we have the ratio described in (19) for use in (18), to calculate, in terms
of its labor cost, the rate of increase in lighting efficiency. Based on Nordhaus’s
work, applying (18) for the period of 1750 + 1992 = 3742 years, and using the
result from (76), we find that the average rate of increase r in lighting efficiency
is,
ln
(
41.5
.000119
)
÷ 3742 = .00341 per year, (77)
or 3.41% per decade.
Years Average increase in lumens per hour of labor
1750 B.C.E. to 1992 3.41% per decade
Table 6: The average rate of increase in lighting efficiency, based on data from
[41].
5.4 Inferences and problems arising out of rate data
The closeness of the rate of English lexical growth, from 1150 to 1989—3.453%
per decade, which is 0.0353 high—and from 1657 to 1989—3.391% per decade,
which is 0.019 less—compared to the 3.41% per decade increase in lighting
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efficiency, is remarkable. An estimate of society’s average general collective
problem solving rate based on a longer period of time, all other things being
equal, is likely to be more accurate, as implied by Tables 1 and 2. Having regard
for the error analysis summarized in Tables 1 and 2, a 10% error in an estimate
of N(t2) for a period of time from 1750 B.C.E. to 1992, 3,742 years, would
result in an error in the estimate of the rate per decade of less than 1/10th of
a percent. Since the 3,742 years covered by Nordhaus’s study is much longer
than the periods of time considered for English lexical growth and for increasing
average IQs, and since the average rate of increase in average IQs and the average
English lexical growth rate are so close to the average rate of increase in lighting
efficiency, the 3.41% per decade average increase in lighting efficiency is likely
a more reliable estimate of society’s general, collective, problem solving rate. I
therefore propose to use 3.41% per decade as the estimate of society’s recent
average general collective problem solving rate. If Nordhaus’s lighting study is
used as a benchmark, that suggests that our lexical data for 1657 is somewhat
more reliable than our lexical data for 1150, which was used to calculate the
average English lexical growth rate from 1150 to 1989. All four rates—the rate
at which average IQs increase, the calculation of average English lexical growth
for two periods of time, and the rate of increase in lighting efficiency—almost
coincide.
Although the close correspondences of these calculated rates supports the
hypothesis that society has a general collective problem solving rate, these cor-
respondences raised three problems—possible inconsistencies—for me when I
first read Nordhaus’s paper in the fall of 2008.
The first problem raised by Nordhaus’s lighting study was: how is it possible
for the rate of problem solving to be about 3.41% per decade back to 1,750
years B.C.E., when according to my (erroneous) calculations, done in 2005, it
was 2% per decade from 600 to 1989? I had taken 1657, the end point of the
University of Toronto’s Early Middle English (EMEDD) historical dictionary
project, to date the size of the English lexicon in 1657, and had found an English
lexical growth rate of 3.391% per decade from 1657 to 1989. I had originally
(and mistakenly) guessed that the year 600 was an appropriate dating for Old
English; U of T’s Old English dictionary project takes the lexicon to 1150. It
seems clear in retrospect that the ending year of a dictionary should be used
because the lexicon grows cumulatively. A second error of lesser import was
taking the number of letters in the Old English alphabet as 24, whereas U of
T’s Old English dictionary project says that Old English had 22 letters. Based
on the 8 letters now completed by U of T’s Old English dictionary project,
and assuming the number of words per letter is representative of the number
of words per letter in the Old English lexicon, the estimated number of words
in the Old English lexicon is 34,020 at the year 1150. These changes led to a
revised English lexical growth rate, from 1150 to 1989, of 3.453% per decade,
not inconsistent with Nordhaus’s results, and resolving the first problem raised
by Nordhaus’s paper. Ironically, the original, incorrectly observed, discrepancy
in English lexical growth rates, between 2% per decade for the years 600 to
1989 and 3.391% per decade for 1657 to 1989, led me, in order to explain the
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apparent increase in the average English lexical growth rate, to an inference
which likely is correct, that there are composite factors in the average English
lexical growth rate, and, it follows, in the average IQ, which in turn suggests
the idea of an innate IQ.
The second problem raised by Nordhaus’s lighting study was: exactly what
collective problems are solved by society? While society’s general, collective
problem solving capacity is conceivably indirectly tested in IQ tests, and is di-
rectly applied in solving language problems, it is more difficult to think that
society’s general collective problem solving capacity directly applies to individ-
uals inventing lighting improvements. How can the problem solving of a few
inventors per generation be viewed as representative of society’s general collec-
tive problem solving capacity? This second problem raised by Nordhaus’s paper
study is resolved if collective problem solving is evaluative, and the resolution
of this second problem raised by Nordhaus’s paper has been incorporated into
this article. Another possible resolution, not inconsistent with the first sug-
gested resolution, is that the problem solving capacity of the average inventor
increases in proportion to the increase in society’s general collective problem
solving capacity, as the depth of society’s store of abstractions and theories
increases. Inventors, like everyone else in society, benefit from the increasing
depth of the abstractions they use that are a collective achievement of society.
The third problem raised by Nordhaus’s lighting study concerns the factors
that affect society’s general collective problem solving rate. If a function of
population size is a factor, how is it that the population involved in evaluating
lighting innovations still exhibits the same rate of increase as exhibited by an
English speaking population, despite the two populations likely being different
in their sizes, individuals, and eras? Perhaps it is because the average innate, or
basal, rate of problem solving is so low that a few thousand years is not enough
time for differences in population to have a large effect. Perhaps for large
populations, the difference in the logarithm of the population sizes is relatively
small. Perhaps people are so networked that the relevant networked population
is that of all of humanity.
The estimates of society’s general collective problem solving rate are all
consistent with the hypothesis that there is a general problem solving capacity,
and are mutually confirmatory. We conclude that it is likely the case that, in
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recent historical times:
d |{PSSociety(t)}|
dt
=
d |LexEnglish|
dt
=
d |{PSLang}|
dt
=
d(IQAv)
dt
=
d(IQSociety)
dt
=
d |Lux|
dt
=
(
d |{PS}|
dt
)
Av
≈ 3.41% per decade.
(78)
The result in (78) compresses much compiled data—all of which required
a proportionate amount of energy for researchers to compile —into a succinct
statement. Devising the concepts of IQ and intelligence testing took problem
solving energy. Skilled design and administration of IQ tests to hundreds of
thousands of people requires the expenditure of energy by many people. Only
the problem solving work that laid the foundation for IQ testing permits re-
searchers to have available results which permit them to estimate—spending
yet more energy—the rate at which average IQ test scores increase.
The possibility of estimating a lexical growth rate increases with the avail-
ability of historical dictionary projects. Each word in a dictionary involves the
cumulative energy of those many different people over many generations who:
used the words in writing, located usages of each word, evaluated each word
for its use and convenience, made a professional, learned judgment as to the
appropriateness of including a word as a distinct word in the dictionary.
Nordhaus’s lighting study first required him to conceive the idea of esti-
mating the rate of increase in lighting efficiency in order to test how well price
indexes measure changes in the cost of living. In his paper, he summarizes the
history of lighting, compares light outputs, finds labor costs, and calculates the
increase in lighting efficiency in different ways, based on data he collected. In
the appendix, he describes the steps he took to measure the light output of
firewood and sesame oil lamps.
The possibility of formulating a statement such as that in (78) arose only
recently. Nordhaus’s lighting study was published in 1997. IQ testing began
around 1905, Tuddenham’s study was published in 1948, and much of the IQ
test data used to estimate the rate of increase in average IQs was gathered since
1970. The University of Toronto’s historical English dictionary projects began
around the 1990s. The accessibility of such information has been enhanced by
the internet, itself the product of many solved problems.
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Thus, the recent addition to society’s store of solved problems has enabled
an analysis that would have been impossible thirty, and perhaps even fifteen,
years ago. Other possible sources of data might include the system developed
by Arpad Elo used to rank chess players.6
A summary to this point is:
• Intelligence is a problem solving capacity.
• A problem solving capacity is equivalent to a problem solving rate.
• Society’s intelligence is an emergent collective phenomenon.
• An IQ estimates an individual’s problem solving rate.
• In principle, the rate of increase in the average individual problem solving
rate should equal the rate of increase in society’s average general problem
solving rate, as in (63).
• Data for three different kinds of problem solving—involving IQ tests, lex-
icons, and lighting—are all consistent with, and mutually confirmatory
of, the existence of society having an emergent general collective problem
solving capacity.
• Society’s average general collective problem solving rate is close to 3.41%
per decade.
One implication of the foregoing affects a thesis, accepted by many linguists
since the 1950s [25, pp. 419–421], that human facility with grammar is ge-
netically based—that human facility with grammar is an “innate endowment”,
a“biological endowment”, or a “language instinct.” Society’s general collective
problem solving capacity applies to solving the problem of devising and im-
proving a grammar to make the use of language more useful, convenient and
efficient. Individual human beings, including young children, each with a vast
network of neurons, easily learn the grammar that generations of society have
invented and refined, because grammar, among other things, was designed to
be easily learnable by everyone. About the proponents of grammar as a genetic
endowment, Terence Deacon has written:
“They argue that even much more extensive experience of the type
that children do not get might still be insufficient to allow one to
discover the abstract rules that constitute the grammar of a nat-
ural language. . . . They assert that the source of prior support for
language acquisition must originate from inside the brain, on the un-
stated assumption that there is no other possible source. But there
is another alternative: that the extra support for language learning
is vested neither in the brain of the child nor in the brains of parents
or teachers, but outside brains, in language itself”[12, pp. 104 and
105].
6Arpad Elo’s method was brought to my attention by Dr. Steve Jacobs, Toronto.
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From the observations to this point of the article, we argue that grammatical
skill is built into language, and is the emergent result of society’s collective prob-
lem solving. It is difficult, if not impossible, for human beings to distinguish, in
the exercise of their intellect, between what is innate and what is learned. The
depth of grammatical solved problems continuously and emergently improves;
human beings learn those improvements. A “language instinct” is an unneces-
sary hypothesis. Since, moreover, it is unlikely that the brain of a human being
developed a genetically endowed capacity to use grammar before the need for
grammar—as a way to organize words—arose, the hypothesis of a ‘language’
instinct is likely incorrect. Emergence is a likelier explanation.
Another implication of the foregoing affects the puzzle about rising aver-
age IQs. No current consensus exists on what causes increasing average IQs.
The results above suggest that, while for thousands of years the physiological
capacities of a human being—the capacity of a human being’s brain—to solve
problems has remained relatively static, the single networked mind of society
has, over the same period of time, increased its intelligence.
An individual’s intelligence emerges from a network of neurons. An individ-
ual’s innate capacity to solve problems does not change during the individual’s
lifetime, but the individual’s store of solved problems, as one of the factors in
the composite problem solving capacity, does increase, as the individual learns
more during their life. A society’s intelligence emerges from a network of brains,
increasing society’s intelligence not just through current social networking, but
also by society accumulating solved problems. A society’s cumulative capacity
to solve problems does change during the lifetime of the society as the society
accumulates and stores more solved problems. And the lifetime of the single
‘mind’ of society is much longer than that of any individual’s mind. Language
facilitates social networking, and increases society’s capacity to solve problems
and store their solutions. Members of society acquire most of their abstractions
from society’s mind.
As society improves the depth and range of its abstractions, average IQs in-
crease; society’s mind is the primary repository of stored intelligence—of solved
problems. A rising tide (society’s better abstractions) raises all boats (average
individual intelligence). With better conceptual tools, a person (and an inven-
tor) can think more efficiently, applying an unchanging innate problem solving
capacity.
Members of society, through social networking, obtain solutions to problems
solved by the expenditure of other people’s energy. The advantage of learn-
ing solved problems—acquiring knowledge—is that the energy cost of learning
existing solutions is much less than the energy cost of solving problems from
scratch.
In 1832, John Austin observed:
“If our experience and observation of particulars were not gen-
eralized, our experience and observation of particulars would seldom
avail us in practice. To review on the spur of the occasion a host
of particulars, and to obtain from those particulars a conclusion ap-
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plicable to the case, were a process too slow and uncertain to meet
the exigencies of our lives. The inferences suggested to our minds by
repeated experience and observation are, therefore, drawn into prin-
ciples, or compressed into maxims. These we carry about us ready
for use, and apply to individual cases promptly or without hesita-
tion: without reverting to the process by which they were obtained;
or without recalling, and arraying before our minds, the numerous
and intricate considerations of which they are handy abridgments”
[3, p 49].
Indirectly, knowledge increases the effective problem solving output of an
individual—as if the individual had acquired increased energy resources. If
we consider problem solving as a technology, then the increase in the number of
solved problems over time is consistent with Romer’s thesis [48] that endogenous
technological growth promotes economic growth: endogenous problem solving
promotes economic growth.
An individual’s problem solving capacity may seem to originate with the in-
dividual. But an individual’s innate IQ is multiplied by a logarithmic function
of the number of problems solved by society that the individual has learned. The
multiplier is to be credited mostly to society, not to the individual who learns
society’s solved problems. It is difficult—if not impossible—for an individual
to distinguish their own innate problem solving capacity from the benefits of
having had access to society’s store of solved problems (including the benefits of
society’s infrastructure—society’s solved problems made physically manifest).
The philosopher Paul Feyerabend seems to have been alluding to a similar ob-
servation when he remarked that
“We may, of course, abstractly subdivide this process into parts,
and may also try to create a situation where statement and phe-
nomenon seem to be psychologically apart and waiting to be related.
(This is rather difficult to achieve and is perhaps entirely impossi-
ble.) But under normal circumstances such a division does not occur;
describing a familiar situation is, for the speaker, an event in which
statement and phenomenon are firmly glued together.
This unity is the result of a process of learning that starts in one’s
childhood. From our very early days we learn to react to situations
with the appropriate responses, linguistic or otherwise. The teach-
ing procedures both shape the ‘appearance’, or ‘phenomenon’, and
establish a firm connection with words, so that finally the phenom-
ena seem to speak for themselves without outside help or extraneous
knowledge. They are what the associated statements assert them to
be. The language they ‘speak’ is, of course, influenced by the beliefs
of earlier generations which have been held for so long that they no
longer appear as separate principles, but enter the terms of everyday
discourse, and after the prescribed training, seem to emerge from the
things themselves. . . ” [16, p. 57].
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One problem raised by the preceding discussion is: what is the innate, or
basal, problem solving capacity of an individual?
6 Calculating the benefit of networking
6.1 Preliminary considerations
Since the average rate of increase in individual IQs equals the average rate of
increase in society’s IQ, as expressed in (65), an increase in an individual’s
problem solving capacity must be due to networking. Neurons in a single brain
can solve problems. More neurons, in more brains, can solve more problems.
A society has more neurons than any individual member of society. Therefore,
all other things being equal, an increase in a society’s population size should
increase the society’s problem solving capacity.
Let Pop(t) represent population size at year t. Then the immediately pre-
vious observation implies, consistent with (56), that
d|{PSSociety(t)}|
dt
∝ f(Pop(t)). (79)
If the left side in (79) is society’s average general collective problem solving rate,
then the value of the function f(Pop(t)) on the right side should be an average
applicable for the same time period. The economist M. Kremer observes that
“the growth rate of technology is proportional to total population”
[32, p. 681].
Consistent with The General Collective Problem Solving Capacity Hypothesis,
we regard technological innovation as a particular result of the application of
society’s general collective problem solving capacity. We propose that society’s
general collective problem solving rate is proportional to some function of the
total population, f(Pop(t)).
Suppose that the population is unchanging, and consider the effect of a store
of solved problems on society’s general collective problem solving rate. When
an individual is confronted with a problem, the individual can use society’s ex-
isting store of solved problems as a resource; the individual can vary an existing
solution, blend together solutions, and can create a new solution to an existing
or new problem. New problem solving can use procedures—methods that are
themselves solutions to the problem of how to solve other problems—that have
been used in the past to solve problems. The larger the existing store of solved
problems is, the more ways there are to apply an individual’s innate, or basal,
problem solving capacity to a given problem: there are more ways to tackle the
problem. Accordingly, society’s general collective problem solving rate should
be greater when the store of solved problems is greater. Thus, consistent with
(49),
d[|{PSSociety(t)}|]
dt
∝ g(|{PSSociety(t)}|). (80)
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If the left side in (80) is society’s average general collective problem solving rate,
then the value of the function g(|{PSSociety(t)}|) on the right side should also be
an average applicable for the same time period. Kremer writes, consistent with
(80), that research productivity depends on the existing level of technology [32,
p. 689]—what we would characterize as an existing store of solved problems.
(Kremer refers to a then unpublished article by Charles Jones, now [31].)
A function h, assumed to be independent of the functions f(Pop) and
g(|{PSSociety(t)}|), represents the effect on society’s general problem solving
capacity due to the society’s physical environment, climate, and infrastructure,
to the extent that their contributions to problem solving capacities are not al-
ready reflected in f in (79) and g in (80). Even though a society’s current
infrastructure is due to the problem solving capacities of its population in the
past, and to its store of already solved problems, the inherited infrastructure is
not created by society’s current problem solving capacity, and may be consid-
ered to be independent of the society’s current problem solving capacity. We
may suppose that, at a time t,
d|{PSSociety(t)}|
dt
∝ h(|{InfrastructureSociety(t)}|). (81)
The function h will play a possible role later in this article. For now, the
analysis is simpler without it.
From the relationship between society’s general collective problem solving
capacity and the functions f and g expressed in (79) and (80), we infer that
d|{PSSociety(t)}|
dt
∝ f(Pop(t))× g(|{PSSociety(t)}|), (82)
a result similar to (56).
Earlier in this article we inferred that, since the physiology of the human
brain has been relatively unchanged these past several thousands of years, and
the problem solving capacity of an individual human brain is a function of
the physiological capacities of that brain, the average innate problem solving
capacity has also remained unchanged during that period of time. Since a
problem solving capacity is equivalent to the problem solving rate, it follows
that
IQInnate =
(
d|{PSAverage Innate}|
dt
)
Av
= m, (83)
where m is a constant. (82), together with (83), implies that
(
d|{PSIndividual(t)}|
dt
)
Av
∝ m×
d|{PSSociety(t)}|
dt
, (84)
and so, since m is a constant,
(
d|{PSIndividual(t)}|
dt
)
Av
∝
d|{PSSociety(t)}|
dt
. (85)
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In light of the statistical evidence that society has a general collective problem
solving rate, we infer that(
d|{PSIndividual(t)}|
dt
)
Av
=
d|{PSSociety(t)}|
dt
(86)
consistent with The General Collective Problem Solving Capacity Hypothesis
and (65).
Since society has increased its store of solved problems over the generations,
the average problem solving capacity of a human being, with access to an in-
creasing number of society’s solved problems, has also increased, in proportion,
over those generations. If we extrapolate back in time, the reverse observation
would appear to apply. The farther back in time one goes, the smaller is the
value of the function of the number of society’s solved problems that multiplies
an individual’s innate problem solving capacity. Far back in time, the differ-
ence between the problem solving capacity of an individual human being and,
for example, other mammals or primates, would be considerably smaller than
present day differences.
From (78),
d|{PSSociety(t)}|
dt
≈ 3.41% per decade, (87)
society’s general collective problem solving rate. Now applying (82) and (83),
we have
(
d|{PSInnate(t)}|
dt
)
Av
× f([Pop(t)])× g(|{PSSociety(t)}|)
=
d|{PSSociety(t)}|
dt
= 3.41% per decade.
(88)
If we can find functions f and g for f(Pop(t)) and g(|{PSSociety(t)}|), and
quantify their values for a given society at a given time, then we will be able
to quantify the current average innate, or basal, problem solving capacity of an
individual human being—or, equivalently, the average innate, or basal, problem
solving rate—the problem solving capacity that would exist in the absence of
social contact and in the absence of an inherited body of knowledge.
What functions might f and g be? In subsection 4.3, we inferred, based on
an analogy between absolute temperature and IQ as metrics, that f = g = log.
We now explore the nature of f and g from a different perspective, to find the
parameters C (the proportion multiplier) and S (the base of the logarithmic
function) for a society’s store of solved problems and for its population.
Consider societies and lexicons as hierarchically structured networks. People
network with other people. Words network with other words; ideas network with
other ideas. The philosopher David Hume wrote:
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“As all simple ideas may be separated by the imagination, and
may be united again in what form it pleases, nothing would be more
unaccountable than the operations of that faculty, were it not guided
by some universal principles, which render it, in some measure, uni-
form with itself in all times and places. Were ideas entirely loose
and unconnected, chance alone would join them; and it is impossi-
ble the same simple ideas should fall regularly into complex ones (as
they Commonly do) without some bond of union among them, some
associating quality, by which one idea naturally introduces another.
This uniting principle among ideas is not to be considered as an
inseparable connexion; for that has been already excluded from the
imagination: Nor yet are we to conclude, that without it the mind
cannot join two ideas; for nothing is more free than that faculty: but
we are only to regard it as a gentle force, which commonly prevails,
and is the cause why, among other things, languages so nearly cor-
respond to each other; nature in a manner pointing out to every one
those simple ideas, which are most proper to be united in a complex
one” [30, Book I, Sec. IV].
Networks use energy; networks must be structured to use energy efficiently
in order to successfully compete for their environment’s resources, and to thrive.
If there is a general efficiency standard—‘a uniting principle’ based on an emer-
gent ‘gentle force’—for structuring a network regardless of what the constituent
nodes are, then an efficiently structured network should conform to that gen-
eral efficiency standard. We might think of the general efficiency standard as
an ideally efficient network, or, an Ideal Network. We infer that if networks are
structured to conform as closely as possible to an Ideal Network, then networks
should have analogous structures. Since communication is vital to the survival
of human society, we should expect that both social networks and lexical net-
works have adapted to conform as closely as possible to an Ideal Network; this is
the ‘uniting principle.’ If that is so, the same function should apply to describe
the benefit of networking in each. We infer, on that basis as well, that in (82)
f = g. (89)
There is another argument that suggests f = g, besides the argument that
an Ideal Network exists, to which energy efficient networks conform. Suppose
a network consists of n ideas, abstractions, or solved problems. We can infer
that finding each of the functions f and g is equivalent to finding the answer to
the following: find all possible ways that a number of information units of size
r can be distributed among n nodes. The distribution of r information units
among n receivers is similar to a problem that physicists, including James Clerk
Maxwell, Ludwig Boltzmann and J. Willard Gibbs, worked on from about 1870
to 1900, now considered to be part of statistical mechanics. Their concern was
not with information units but rather with energy units. But, mathematically,
the two distribution problems are equivalent. Boltzmann followed a procedure
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equivalent to using the factorial expression
(n+ r − 1)!
(n− 1)!r!
(90)
to calculate the number of different ways of distributing r energy units among
r receivers. When n is large, the value of (90) is estimated using Stirling’s
approximation. Stirling’s approximation is used to calculate the value of a
factorial that involves large numbers. One conclusion of statistical mechanics
is that, assuming the independence of the velocity of the energy units being
distributed, the most likely distribution is the one in which the energy is equally
distributed to space elements of an equal size. This isotropic distribution is, in a
sense, the most efficient distribution of energy units to a given volume of space.
The number of combinations of energy units possible is highest when the
distribution to all equal energy receivers is equal, that is, when the probability
of a receiver receiving an energy unit is equal for all receivers—when all receivers
have an equal capacity for receiving energy. The equal distribution of energy
units is the statistically most likely distribution. One might say that when
the number of ways, or paths, in which to create an energy distribution is
maximized, the number of ways for energy to be distributed to the recipients
is maximized; this occurs when the probability of energy being distributed to a
recipient is equalized.
We can consider a network with n nodes to be analogous to a statistical
mechanical system of n elements. We can consider problem solvers, or solved
problems, such as words, to be nodes in a network. All the energy provided to
problem solvers for problem solving, would, if the problem solvers were perfectly
efficient, be entirely used to produce solved problems. Since a solved problem is
energy-equivalent to the energy input used to solve it—energy in equals energy-
equivalent information out—the network of problem solvers should be isotropic
with respect to energy use if the energy input is isotropic. Since the analysis
of a network of problem solvers and a network of solved problems can both
be analogized to the statistical mechanical problem of distributing energy (or
information) among n receivers, there is further support for the idea that f =
g. Network energy distribution systems are structurally analogous.
The question, how much does networking increase the innate, or basal, prob-
lem solving capacity of an individual, is analogous to a question about how to
maximize the efficiency of the distribution of energy in statistical mechanics.
Because of the fundamental role of energy in all kinds of systems, it is likely not
a mere coincidence.
6.2 A network capacity multiplier, based on the network’s
path length
To assist us in deriving the function f used in f(Pop)(t), let’s consider a so-
cial network in which information is distributed by an individual to one other
individual at a time. An individual A is one step away from individual B if B
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directly transmits information to A. A is two steps away from individual C if C
first transmits information to B who then transmits C’s information to A. And
so on. There exists some distance—a pair-wise, or bi-nodal, distance expressible
in steps—between any two individuals in the network.
Suppose there exists a network of finitely many individuals n, any two of
which are separated by a finite distance, measured in steps. To simplify things,
assume that all transmitters transmit information at the same rate, and that
all receivers receive information at that same rate. These assumptions result in
the network being isotropic, both in the transmission and in the reception of
information. The total of all the pair-wise distances, in steps, is finite, because
every pair-wise distance is finite, and for the network there are only a finite
number of all possible pairs. If we divide the total of all the pair-wise distances
for all distinct pairs by the total number of possible pairs, we obtain a finite
average distance, S, measured in steps, and which in network science is given
the name: the path length. That is, the average pair of nodes, or individuals, in
the network connects in an average of S steps. Colloquially, the path length is
called degrees of separation. Just as absolute temperature measures the quantity
of heat in a system, and IQ measures an individual’s intelligence, a ‘step’ is a
metric that measures a distance. Here, the average distance between nodes in a
network is measured by the average number of steps from one to the other. In a
sense, the path length is a more fundamental metric than absolute temperature
(where the degree measure has reference to the freezing and boiling point of
water); at any given point of time, a network’s path length is intrinsic to that
network. For the path length, no reference scale is required other than the
network itself.
There exists some number η (the small Greek letter, eta, η) such that
Sη = n, (91)
for a network consisting of n nodes, where S is the network’s path length.
Along a path S steps long there are located S possible information sources.
Notionally only, a person has the capacity to receive information from the whole
network in the following way. We consider a source that is S steps away the first
cluster generation, a source 2 × S steps away a second cluster generation, and
in general a source η × S steps away a ηth cluster generation. (91) shows that
there are η cluster generations. Since all nodes in the network are only S steps
apart, all the network’s nodes are in each cluster generation. Looking at cluster
generations collectively, since every node in the network can be connected to
every other node in an average of S steps, it does not matter in what cluster
generation a receiver resides; the transmitter can reach it in an average of S
steps.
The structure of cluster generations—the scaling
η S′s︷ ︸︸ ︷
S × S × S × · · · × S (92)
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implicit in (91)—is such that when the exponent of S goes up by one, something
in the network must be scaling up by a factor S, while leaving the number of
nodes per cluster generation unchanged. We infer that the number of clusters
per cluster generation scales up by S while the number of nodes per cluster scales
down by 1/S; in that way the number of nodes per cluster generation is constant.
It must be that cluster generations with more clusters are nested in cluster
generations with fewer clusters, because each cluster generation contains all the
network’s nodes. We denote each generation by the term cluster generation
because while all the network’s nodes are in each notional cluster generation,
each distinct cluster generation varies in the number of clusters and the number
of nodes per cluster, by some power of S.
Isolated clusters. Now consider any single cluster of S nodes. Suppose the
pair-wise, bi-nodal rate of information transmission in that cluster is S steps
per second, and suppose that applies to any pair of nodes. Then the average
time for a node in the network to connect to any other node within that single
cluster (which in turn is in a single cluster generation) is one second, because
the average bi-nodal distance is S steps. To traverse η disconnected cluster
generations—that is, η distinct networks each of n nodes—would take η seconds
at the pair-wise, or bi-nodal, rate of S steps per second.
Networked clusters. For networked nodes, S steps is the average pair-wise
distance for all possible nodal pairs in the network; for one node to connect to
any other node in the same network at a pair-wise rate of S steps per second
gives the node a capacity to traverse all η cluster generations in only S steps,
or, in only one second—not η seconds—because all nodes in the network are (an
average of) only S steps apart. The capacity to traverse η separate clusters in
η separated cluster generations at the rate of S steps per second is equivalent to
having the capacity to traverse all networked η cluster generations at the pair-
wise rate of S steps per second. Thus, upon networking, an isolated pair-wise
or bi-nodal rate of S steps per second becomes a Network Rate equivalent to
ηS steps per second.
Let’s try another way of looking at this.
Let ‖ai, bi‖i be the distance in steps between 2 nodes, ai and bi, in the ith
cluster generation of a network, N , with n nodes.
Let S, as above, be N ’s path length, the average distance in steps between
any pair of nodes in N . From (91),
logS(n) = η. (93)
Now, from (91), within the ith cluster generation,
‖ai, bi‖i = S, ∀ai, bi ∈ N, ai 6= bi, ∀i ≤ η. (94)
What the discussion about pair-wise distances implies is that the same en-
ergy used for a transmission of S steps between any two nodes in N , also allows
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a transmission that traverses the equivalent of all η cluster generations, which
in steps would be:
‖a1, b1‖1 + ‖a2, b2‖2 + . . .+ ‖aη, bη‖η
= ‖ai, bj‖ , ∀ai, bj ∈ N, ai 6= bj, ∀i, j ≤ η
= η × S, ∀a, b ∈ N,
(95)
or, alternatively,
‖a1, a2‖1 + ‖a2, a3‖2 + . . .+ ‖aη−1, aη‖η
= ‖ai, aj‖ , ∀ai, aj ∈ N, ai 6= aj , ∀i, j ≤ η
= η × S.
(96)
S ‘spans’ the first lines in (95) and (96), because the average distance between
any two nodes in N is S; S steps traverses all η cluster generations. This aspect
of a network described by (95) shows part of the significance of the path length
as a network parameter.
The same capacity that enables a signal to traverse a distance of S steps in
an isolated 2 node system, enables the same signal to traverse the equivalent of
η × S steps in a fully networked system.7
The foregoing discussion leads to the following:
Isotropic Network Rate Theorem. If non-networked nodes in an isotropic
information network of n nodes transmit information pair-wise at the bi-nodal
rate r, then, when the nodes are networked, the network information transmis-
sion rate is equivalent to ηr, where
logS (n) = η.
The same energy that permits an isolated bi-nodal (2-node) network to transmit
at the rate r, results in a network rate of transmission at the rate ηr. Or in
other words, the same energy proportional to S that spans an isolated bi-nodal
(2-node) network, spans all possible bi-nodal pairs when they are isotropically
networked.
Since not all networks are isotropic—people in a network do not have uni-
formly equal relationships to all other people in the network—The Isotropic
Network Rate Theorem does not describe the most general network structure.
Before generalizing the theorem to the non-isotropic situation, we discuss why
The Isotropic Network Rate Theorem is, implicitly, a statement about the ther-
modynamics of a network.
Suppose it takes the exact same amount of energy, ǫ, to transmit a unit of
information one step. Then it takes S energy units ǫ, that is Sǫ energy units,
to transmit one information unit S steps. If S scales n, as (91) suggests, then
7An example of Nature’s economy, subtlety and wit.
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it is equally the case that Sǫ energy units scales (Sǫ)η = n energy units. That
is, if
Sη = n (97)
implies
logS(n) = logS(S
η)
= η,
(98)
it must be that
(Sǫ)η = n (99)
implies
logSǫ(n) = logSǫ([Sǫ]
η)
= η.
(100)
The path length appears to scale a network of n nodes, but what is really
occurring is that the network’s energy resources are being scaled by an amount
of energy proportional to Sǫ.
Energy scaling, which is due to nodes networking, confers an enormous en-
ergy advantage: two nodes, isolated from any other nodes, that have the ca-
pacity to transmit information to each other at a rate of S steps per time unit,
have their capacity to transmit information boosted to a rate of ηS steps per
time unit when networked. Because of this multiplicative effect of networking on
the pair-wise, or bi-nodal, transmission rate for two isolated nodes, an isotropic
network allows the parts of a network to communicate faster than it is possible
for any two individual nodes to communicate outside of the network. In view of
this multiplicative effect, we may suppose that, for nodes with the same bi-nodal
capacities, no isolated bi-nodal transmission of information can be faster than
the network transmission rate within an isotropic network. This inference may
be styled
The Ideal Network Theorem. For a set of nodes with the same bi-nodal ca-
pacity to transmit information, no isolated bi-nodal transmission of information
can be faster than the network transmission rate within an isotropic network.
The scaling intrinsic to an isotropic network results in an optimal rate of
information transmission. An optimal rate of information transmission suggests
that the system, in this case a network, is using energy as efficiently as possible.
The isotropic network is therefore an Ideal Network. This is additional support
for the view suggested earlier in this article that there is a general efficiency
standard, an Ideal Network, for structuring a network regardless of what the
constituent nodes are.
6.3 Deriving the General Network Rate Theorem
Actual social and other networks, however, are not perfectly isotropic. In social
and other networks, not all adjacent persons and nodes actually connect equally,
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but only some of them. For any given node, only some proportion of its adjacent
nodes are connected to it. The average of all these proportions for all the nodes
in a network is called the clustering coefficient, usually denoted by the letter C
in the science of networks. Measurement of C helps reveal the role of hubs in
networks, among other things [59].
With respect to information transmission in a network, since the network’s
nodes on average connect (locally) to a proportion C of their adjacent nodes,
only a proportion C of all the network’s possible paths are actually (globally)
available for information transmission. (Global and local efficiency is considered
in [34].) In an isotropic network, all paths are available and C = 1.
If 0 < C < 1, then the available energy used to transmit information tra-
verses only a proportion C of the network’s possible paths. The energy efficiency
of information transmission is proportionately reduced; each cluster generation
only receives a proportion C of the energy that would be otherwise available if
all possible paths existed. Hence the multiplicative effect of networking is then
only
C logS (n) = η. (101)
We propose, the
General Network Rate Theorem. Suppose all two node networks in a net-
work of n nodes have a bi-nodal (energy or information) transmission rate
of r. When networked, the nodes have a Network Transmission Rate that is
r×C logS(n), where C is the clustering coefficient for the network, and S is its
path length.
The formula in (101) is the same as the formula found in subsection 4.4,
such as in (50); a proportionality factor C and a logarithmic function are factors
in individual intelligence. Thus we have an answer to the questions posed in
subsection 4.4 about what the parameters C and S represent. The parameters
are those used in network science: C is the clustering coefficient, and S is the
path length, of a network.
In the discussion about the problem solving capacity of individuals in a so-
ciety, we noted that the individual’s innate, or basal, rate is multiplied, through
social networking, by society’s problem solving capacity. From the foregoing
discussion, we see also that a pair-wise, or bi-nodal, transmission rate is mul-
tiplied by networking. For the same network, both the innate, or basal rate,
and the pair-wise, or bi-nodal, rate have identical networking attributes. We
therefore have:
The Equivalency of the Innate and Bi-nodal Rates Theorem. The in-
nate, or basal, capacity of an individual to transmit or receive information—
solved problems— is the same as the individual’s isolated pair-wise, or bi-nodal,
capacity to transmit information and to receive information.
The physiologically innate, or basal, problem solving capacity of an individ-
ual can not change due to networking; the innate capacity is fixed. But net-
working increases the individual’s problem solving capacity, as implied by (56).
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The individual, when networked, has different and greater capacities. How is
it possible for the innate, or basal, capacity to be fixed, and the pair-wise, or
bi-nodal, rate to be fixed, and yet the networked capacity of an individual to
be greater?
When the innate, or basal, problem solving capacity is applied within an
isolated bi-nodal network, the bi-nodal problem solving rate and the network’s
problem solving rate are the same. When the innate, or basal, problem solving
capacity is applied within a network of n nodes, n > S, the bi-nodal rate and
the network rate are not the same; the network’s rate is C logS(n) = η times
larger. Since the innate, or basal, problem solving capacity is fixed, it must be
that the higher network problem solving capacity that results from networking
is due to this: the innate, or basal, problem solving capacity has more ways to
be applied.
The number of ways in which the innate, or basal, problem solving capacity
can be applied is increased by C logS(n) = η times. In a sense, the larger the
η of an information network is, the more degrees of freedom there are in the
exercise of an innate problem solving capacity. Each scaling of the lexicon by
its path length, each increase in the exponent of a network’s scaling factor S
from k to k+1, represents another scaled path along which the problem solving
capacity can go, at the rate of S steps per choice of path. The same observation
applies to any network of solved problems. It also applies to transmission of
information within a social network. For each step in a path length of S steps,
a socially networked person has S path choices. Each scaling of the population
network by its path length represents another path along which information can
be transmitted, at the rate of S steps per choice of path.
The Equivalency of the Innate and Bi-nodal Rates Theorem suggests that
individuals do not increase their physiologically innate, or basal, problem solving
capacity by networking; instead, networking just increases the number of paths
along which their innate, or basal, problem solving capacity can be exercised.
All other things being equal, a person A biking in a town with 100 streets has
not seen more town streets—paths—than a person biking in a town with one
street—path—because A is innately more adventurous or intelligent. It’s just
that A has more choices of places to go. The person who has a one path bi-
nodal capacity can use it on any number of paths, given the opportunity. An
individual might, due to the subtle way a network multiplies individual capacity,
fail to appreciate the contribution of fortuitous circumstances to their individual
capacity, as suggested in the Feyerabend quote at page 45.
Ants of the same ant colony travel diverse paths in their quest for a food
source. There is an element of randomness in an individual ant’s search for food.
But collectively, ants explore all their available options, and that multiplies
their general collective problem solving capacity. When an ant, or a group
of ants, discovers a path to a food source that is superior to the alternatives,
many more ants will follow that path. The other ants favor those paths, out of
those many tested, which have proven to be the most advantageous. Similarly,
human societies, through their individual members, explore diverse solutions to
general collective problems. When solutions are found that society collectively
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evaluates as being superior to the alternatives, many more people will adopt
those solutions, so that those solutions are preserved in society’s store of solved
problems.
Another way of looking at it is this. Mathematically, it appears that an
individual A’s physiologically innate problem solving rate m is multiplied by η
when A has a set of knowledge, represented by {PS}A. Here, {PS}A is what
A knows—the set of solved problems that A knows. So A’s average problem
solving capacity is (η × m) × |{PS}A|. What the hypothesis above says is
that this is mathematically correct, but conceptually wrong. The number of
solved problems produced by applying m is m × (η × |{PSA}|); the innate, or
basal, problem solving capacity, equivalent to the problem solving rate m, has
η times as many paths—η × |{PS}|— it can take. A person may perceive that
their innate problem solving capacity is m × η, but m has not altered; after
an individual is born, what changes the individual IQ is the number of solved
problems that the individual has learned. Intelligence is the capacity to solve
problems. In a society, an individual’s problem solving capacity is the product of
the factors set out in (56). Innate capacity alone does not determine individual
problem solving capacity.
This discussion suggests a
Capacity Multiplier Theorem. The physiologically innate problem solving
capacity of an individual is multiplied by the number of ways in which that capac-
ity can be exercised when it is applied to a network of n nodes. The multiplicative
factor that multiplies an individual’s problem solving capacity is C logS [N(t)],
where N(t) enumerates the amount of information available to the individual at
a time t.
6.4 Isotropy and the natural logarithm
If isotropy underlies, or leads to, the maximum possible rate of information
transmission in a network, perhaps isotropy also, by analogy, explains the max-
imum rate of energy transmission in our universe. According to the big bang
theory of cosmological origins, the universe began as a burst of radiating energy
from a point source. In the 1960s, scientists found a uniform cosmic background
radiation in the sky, in all directions, at a temperature consistent with the big
bang theory. In the 1990s, astronomical observations by a device called the Far-
Infrared Absolute Spectrophotometer, housed in a satellite called the Cosmic
Background Explorer (COBE ), measured the spectrum of the cosmic microwave
background radiation as being isotropic to within one part in 100,000 [18]. The
universe is highly isotropic.
Consider a creation scenario for a universe. Suppose that before a universe
begins, at what might be called a singularity—a point of no dimensions existing
outside of and before time, and outside of a universe that does not yet exist—
there is an enormous amount of energy, ω. At creation, the energy isotropically
fractures into S energy clusters each with ω/S energy units. Assume, for sim-
plicity’s sake, that S is unchanging over time, and so acts as a consistent scaling
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factor. Suppose that each of the first generation energy clusters fractures at
the rate S and that process continues. After k time units, there are Sk energy
clusters, each with ω/Sk energy units, and the process continues. The universe’s
energy cluster generations are all nested in a hierarchy: sub-atomic particles,
atoms, molecules, stars, galaxies, clusters of galaxies. The volume of a kth level
cluster is Vk. The energy density of a kth level cluster with volume Vk, within
a kth level cluster generation, is
ω/Sk
Vk
. (102)
Since there are Sk energy clusters in each cluster generation, the amount of
energy in a cluster generation is calculated as follows
(
ω/Sk
Vk
)
× (SkVk) = ω. (103)
In other words, the total energy of the expanding universe remains constant,
though the energy density decreases as the number of cluster generations in-
creases. In such a universe, there would be no center. All parts of the universe
would appear to expanding from any vantage point.
If we consider the creation scenario for a universe—not necessarily our
universe—as the target of the following analogy and a social network as its
source, the following correspondences apply: the path length S in a social net-
work corresponds to S as a scaling factor in the universe; a kth cluster gener-
ation, to use the terminology earlier in this article, appears in both the source
and target of the analogy; and nodes per cluster generation in a social network
correspond to energy units per cluster generation in the universe.
Since the two systems, a social network and the universe described above,
have analogous scaling features, as a heuristic we may infer that perhaps the
universe began with the isotropic distribution of energy because that allowed for
the fastest possible transmission of energy between parts of the universe, just
as, for a given amount of information, the isotropic distribution of information
allows for the fastest transmission of information in an information network.
If our universe began in a way similar to the theoretical universe above, then
a social network should not be the source of an analogy that models the universe,
but rather the target. The universe preceded social networks; the universe is
the source of the analogy.
More likely, the structure of a social network is constrained by the isotropic
way in which our universe began; the manner of creation of the universe gov-
erns the thermodynamics of social networks. In the energy scaling model of a
universe, the universe continually procreates cluster generations of energy that
physically originate from earlier energy cluster generations. If the scaling of the
universe’s energy is uniform, then each succeeding cluster generation in the uni-
verse has the same amount of energy. By way of analogy, organisms procreate
new generations of organisms that physically originate from earlier organism
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generations. Procreation appears to follow the same model, for the universe, for
organisms and for social networks. The physicist John Wheeler said that
“the laws of physics . . .must have come into being at the big bang”
[60].
The physical environment of a social network precedes its existence. Sup-
pose that an energy source distributes energy isotropically to a social network’s
physical environment. This supposition is a reasonable approximation to con-
ditions at the surface of the Earth. For a small geographic area of a few square
miles, for a height above ground of up to 100 feet say, and for a time period of a
few hours or a day, the air temperature is usually contained within a moderate
range. A uniform temperature would indicate that, approximately, heat energy
is isotropically distributed within such an atmospheric volume. Similarly, energy
received from the sun’s radiation in such an area would be relatively uniform—
isotropic. In order not to waste the available energy, the energy-receiving plants
and animals should emulate an approximately isotropic hierarchical structure;
otherwise there will be a mismatch between energy inputs and energy usage by
the receivers, and available energy will be wasted. The isotropic distribution of
energy appears to describe the ideally efficient manner of energy distribution in
our universe, given the isotropic manner of its creation.
Suppose the universe’s total energy is ω, its initial energy density E0, and
its initial volume V0 such that, for any k
th cluster generation,
E0
Sk
× [SkV0] = E0 × V0 = ω. (104)
The implication of (104) for a universe to which it applies is that subsystems
in the universe of the same size contain the same amount of energy distributed in
a uniform way. This implication is analogous to The General Collective Problem
Solving Capacity Hypothesis : subsets of society’s solved problems that contain
the same amount of information required the same—uniform—amount of energy
to create.
For the universe to which (104) applies, the entropy η of the universe is
logS
(
Sk
)
= k. (105)
In thermodynamics, entropy was originally defined with respect to its rate
of change, dη. The classical definition of entropy is
dη =
dQ
T
(106)
for Q a quantity of heat, dQ a change in that amount of heat, and T the absolute
temperature at which the change of heat occurs. Since T ∝ Q, it could be said
that the classical definition of entropy implies that the logarithm of energy
density is inversely proportional to entropy, as an energy scaling perspective
implies. In terms of the preceding discussion, the change in entropy is the
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logarithm of the ratio of the number of clusters for a later kth cluster generation
compared to an earlier jth cluster generation, k − j > 0, so that
dη = logS
(
Sk
Sj
)
= k − j. (107)
As k increases, the number of clusters, Sk, per cluster generation increases,
the volume of the universe increases, and the energy density of a cluster de-
creases. Here, k − j > 0 implies that the energy density of the universe is
decreasing as the entropy increases, consistent with entropy being a measure of
the increasing dispersion of energy in the universe. Entropy in this view is a way
of counting the scalings—the number of S-scaled energy cluster generations—of
the energy of the universe. If scaling occurs at a fixed rate, the rate of change
in entropy is proportional to the rate of change in time, all other things being
equal; entropy is proportional to the age of the universe. In this perspective,
for the universe,
η ∝ Sk (108)
for k generations, and in general,
dη ∝ logS
(
Sk
Sj
)
= k − j, (109)
for k − j > 0. In particular, using (107), we may infer equality such that
dη = logS
(
Sk
Sj
)
= k − j. (110)
If the Capacity Multiplier Theorem applied to the universe’s energy, then the
universe’s fastest bi-nodal rate multiplied by the entropy of all the universe’s
energy would give a maximum speed limit for that universe, because no entropy
of energy could be greater the entropy of the universe’s total energy.
The energy scaling perspective on entropy is consistent with ideas about
the big bang origin of the universe, ideas which did not exist until long after
Boltzmann’s probabilistic derivation of entropy in the 1870s. The energy scaling
perspective permits a succinct explanation of why the natural logarithm plays
a prominent role in our universe. We can infer that the natural logarithm arises
because the universe is, in a sense, an Ideal Network, that is, isotropic.
6.4.1 The Natural Logarithm Theorem
Suppose a single node is supplied with Sǫ energy units, which enables the node
to transmit information S steps. With Sǫ energy units, the node can reach
any node in the network. That is, following (98) and (100), in general the
transmission capacity of a single node using Sǫ energy units per time unit is
Sη = n (111)
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nodes. The same transmitting node, using Sǫ energy units per time unit, can
traverse η = logS(n) cluster generations of networked nodes per time unit.
The capacity of a node in a cluster generation—each nested cluster gen-
eration contains all the network’s nodes—to receive information in one of the
η = logS(n) cluster generations is
dη
dn
=
d [logS S
η]
d(Sη)
=
1
ln (S)Sη
.
(112)
In an isotropic network, the Sη per node capacity to transmit information to
the network’s n nodes should be exactly inverse to the 1ln(S)Sη per node capacity
to receive information. That is, in an isotropic network
Sη = ln (S)Sη. (113)
It follows from (113) that ln(S) = 1. Thus, for an isotropic network, S = e; in
an isotropic network, the path length is the natural logarithm, e. This result
applies to isotropic systems generally. That is, we have demonstrated
The Natural Logarithm Theorem. An isotropic network is scaled by the
natural logarithm e. That is, in an isotropic network the scaling factor (and the
path length)
S = e.
A corollary of The Natural Logarithm Theorem is: if a network is isotropic,
its path length is invariant.
The Natural Logarithm Theorem provides an explanation of the role of the
natural logarithm in our universe. If an isotropic network is the most energy
efficient kind of network—the ‘Ideal Network’—then networks which obtain an
advantage by being energy efficient should adapt to be approximately isotropic.
As the cumulative amount of energy supplied to a network grows, the network
should grow, according to The Natural Logarithm Theorem, by a power of the
natural logarithm. The natural logarithm’s role in modeling many different
kinds of systems, including the energy relationship between quanta in quantum
mechanics, is consistent with The Natural Logarithm Theorem.
The energy scaling perspective facilitates proof of The Natural Logarithm
Theorem. The identification of the path length as proportional to the energy
scaling factor plays an important, if not indispensable, role in the proof of The
Natural Logarithm Theorem. The proof of The Natural Logarithm Theorem us-
ing the energy scaling perspective increases our confidence that the path length
plays a vital role in networks. It is consistent with the fundamental role that
the natural logarithm plays in so many phenomena that a fundamental and
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intrinsic feature of networks, namely the path length, is required to show the
fundamental and intrinsic role of the natural logarithm in isotropic networks.
This proof is consistent with The Isotropic Network Rate Theorem and the Ca-
pacity Multiplier Theorem, and supports their validity.
6.4.2 The Network Entropy Theorem
Using The Natural Logarithm Theorem, we can now state
The Network Entropy Theorem. The formula for the entropy η of a network
is in general
η = C logS(n), (114)
where C is the network’s clustering coefficient, and S is its path length. In
particular, for an isotropic network, C = 1, S = e where e is the natural
logarithm, and
η = loge(n). (115)
7 Testing a theory of intelligence
7.1 About the data in Table 7
Thus far we have found, in addition to the principled arguments in favor of
the existence of society’s average general collective problem solving capacity,
statistical support using the rate at which average IQs increase, the English
lexicon grows and lighting efficiency improves. Having found an actual rate,
3.41% per decade, for society’s average general collective problem solving rate,
(56) and (59) suggest attempting to find the average individual’s physiologically
innate, or basal, problem solving rate. To find the average innate, or basal,
problem solving rate led to the quest for functions of population and of society’s
solved problems that multiply the innate, or basal, problem solving rate in a
network, which, it is proposed, is C logS(n). Principled arguments in favor of the
validity of C logS(n) as a network’s rate multiplier have been set out above. To
increase our confidence that C logS(n) multiplies the innate, or basal, problem
solving rate in a network, we require numerical results that are consistent with
its proposed role as a network rate multiplier. The more unlikely it is that the
numerical results are close to each other as a result of coincidence, the stronger
our confidence that f = g = C logS N(t). Each result that is consistent with
The General Collective Problem Solving Capacity Hypothesis may not by itself
be proof of the existence of society’s general collective problem solving capacity,
but several different consistent results, obtained in different ways with different
data, may together increase our confidence that The General Collective Problem
Solving Capacity Hypothesis is true.
For the first through fifth sets of numerical results obtained for the purpose
of supporting the role of C logS(n) as a network’s rate multiplier, I use the
data set out in Table 7. For each indicated category in Table 7, the number
of nodes has been determined from sources that are described in the notes to
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Network Nodes Number of nodes S C η Notes
Actors people 225,226 3.65 0.79 7.52 1
C. elegans neurons 282 2.65 0.28 1.62 1
Human Brain neurons 1011 2.49 0.53 14.71 2
1989 English words 616,500 2.67 0.437 5.932 3, 4
1150 English words 34,020 2.67 0.437 4.643 4, 5
1657 English words 200,000 2.67 0.437 5.431 4, 6
1989 population people 350,000,000 3.65 0.79 12.0 7, 8
1150 population people 2,300,000 3.65 0.79 8.938 7, 9
1657 population people 5,281,347 3.65 0.79 9.445 7, 10
Table 7: Calculations of η
Notes to Table 7
1. The network of actors, its number of nodes, and the values for S and
C are from [59].
2. The number of neurons is from [40, p.480]. S and C are from [1].
3. The number of words is from the OED.
4. The values for S and C are from [15] based on about 3/4 of the million
words appearing in the British National Corpus. The British National Corpus
consists of about 70 million words of written English, used to obtain statistical
information about the use of the English lexicon. [38] found S=3.16 and C=.53
based on an online English thesaurus of about 30,000 words. [15]’s sample size
is larger and likely more representative of actual usage of English words.
5. The number of words is based on the University of Toronto’s Old English
Dictionary project.
6. The number of words is from EMEDD [63].
7. The values for S and C are based on the actors study of [59].
8. The number of people is an estimate of the English speaking societies in
1989, determined by adding the number of people determined for censuses
for the USA, 248.7 million people, according to the US census 1990 [36];
Canada 27,296,859 people in 1991 [66]; England 50,748,000 people in 1991
[67]; Australia, 16,850,540 people in 1991 [68, p. 11]. These total 343,595,000
people.
9. The number of people in England is based on Hinde’s remark (at p. 28) in
his book on England’s population that 1.6 to 1.7 million people at the time
of the Domesday Book, 1086, are the estimates that are most likely to be
accurate, and his estimate (at p. 24) of English population growth of 0.5% per
year for the period 1086 to 1348 [28]. On the Domesday population, similar
estimates are found in [51, p. 149], [26, p. 53], and [54, p. 34].
10. The number of people in England is from [61, Table 7.8, following p. 207,
for the year 1656].
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the table. In the column headed S is the path length, in the column headed C,
the clustering coefficient, for the different networks listed in the first column in
Table 7.
The path lengths and clustering coefficients for English populations at the
various times shown in Table 7 are based on the path length and clustering coef-
ficient measured by Watts and Strogatz for 225,226 actors in the Internet Movie
Database, set out in their 1998 article [59]. We assume, in the calculations that
follow, that 225,226 actors are a large enough number of people to be represen-
tative of the English speaking networked population generally. Since we infer
that social networks in similar societies all approximate a general standard—an
Ideal Network—for social networks, and that culture changes slowly enough not
to much alter the values for S and C for a society over time, the values for S
and C in the study by Watts and Strogatz are likely similar to those for the
different English populations described in the first column in Table 7.
Similarly, for the different English lexicons, we assume that the English
lexicons conform to a standard criterion for lexical efficiency, and therefore we
use, for the English lexicon for years 1150 and 1657, the S and C, found, with
the ‘improved method,’ in the paper by Ramon Ferrer i Cancho and Richard V.
Sole´ [15]. For each category in Table 7, I calculated η using (101), based on the
data in same row of Table 7.
7.2 The natural logarithm
The first set of data from Table 7 that we consider relates to The Natural Log-
arithm Theorem. Based on The Natural Logarithm Theorem, an isotropic infor-
mation exchange network is predicted to have a path length close to the value
of the natural logarithm e, 2.71828, because, as set out in (98) and (100), the
path length is strictly proportional to the energy scaling factor for an isotropic
network. We would expect that a neural network, such as the human brain,
which uses a large proportion of an organism’s energy, and is vital to problem
solving based on the organism’s sensory input—information—should be struc-
tured to be approximately isotropic to maximize its energy efficiency, at least
in relation to the network’s path length. A similar observation applies to a net-
work of solved problems, such as a lexicon. Therefore, we would expect that for
a neural network and a network of solved problems affecting the survivability of
an organism, the path length should be close to the path length of an isotropic
network. The values in Table 7 for S for the nervous system of the worm, C.
elegans (2.65), for the English lexicon (2.67), and for the human brain (2.49) are
pretty close to the value of the natural logarithm, e, 2.71828, consistent with our
principled expectations. Further, if The Natural Logarithm Theorem is valid, we
have gained some insight into the structure of these neural and abstraction net-
works; they likely have information exchanges that are approximately isotropic,
consistent with our expectations.
In a social network, not all personal—bi-nodal—relationships are equal; a
social network of human beings is not isotropic. The contrapositive of The
Natural Logarithm Theorem is that if the value of S is not equal to the natural
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logarithm, then the network is not isotropic. In Table 7, the value of S for the
network of 225,226 actors studied in [59], 3.65, is not as close to the value of the
natural logarithm as for a neural network, consistent with our expectations. The
Natural Logarithm Theorem, which arises out of The General Collective Problem
Solving Capacity Hypothesis and The Isotropic Network Rate Theorem, appears
to predict the path length for isotropic networks. We have consistency with
The General Collective Problem Solving Capacity Hypothesis. The values of the
path lengths for neural networks and a network of abstractions, if we assume
that such systems are isotropic, are consistent with the path lengths predicted
by The Natural Logarithm Theorem.
7.3 The human brain
The second set of data relates to the problem solving capacity of the human
brain. In vertebrates, larger nerve fibers are myelinated [40, p. 123]. The
conduction velocity of myelinated nerve fibers varies from “a few meters per
second to more than 100 m/s” [40, p. 123]. The measured conduction velocity
is a pair-wise, or bi-nodal, rate of transmission. To calculate the networked
conduction velocity for the average nerve fiber in the human brain, we apply
the Capacity Multiplier Theorem and multiply the average conduction velocity
by the η of the human brain’s networked neurons estimated in Table 7 to be
14.71. In other words, the brain’s network transmission rate can be estimated
to be, on average, 14.71 times as fast as the average pair-wise, or bi-nodal,
conduction velocity of one of its nerve fibers. Such a network transmission rate
should confer on the human brain a problem solving capacity and speed that
exceeds what we might expect by just looking at the bi-nodal velocity of a nerve
fibre. If the Capacity Mulitiplier Theorem is correct, it may help explain the
observed capacities of the human brain. This expectation is consistent with
what we know about human problem solving capacities, but it is not proof of
The General Collective Problem Solving Capacity Hypothesis.
7.4 The innate, or basal, rate of problem solving
The third set of data has to do with calculation of the average individual’s
innate, or basal, problem solving capacity. In the earlier part of this article,
we estimated that society’s average general collective problem solving rate is
3.41% per decade. Relying on The General Collective Problem Solving Capacity
Hypothesis, the lexicon is a set of solved problems that increases in size at the
same rate as the set of all of society’s solved problems. We will use the English
lexicon and population data to estimate the value of η for the number of solved
problems and population at different years, using the data in Table 7. We found
in (88) that
d|{PSSociety}|
dt
=
(
d|{PSInnate}|
dt
)
Av
× η(Pop)× η(Lex),
A theory of intelligence 66
where
d|{PSSociety}|
dt
= 3.41% (117)
per decade is society’s average general collective problem solving capacity. We
assume that for the past few thousand years, the average innate, or basal rate,
of problem solving,
(
d|{PSInnate(t)}|
dt
)
Av
= m, (118)
the first factor on the right side of (116), has been constant. We need to be able
to assign numerical values to η(Pop) and η(Lex), the other two factors on the
right side of (116).
We have calculated η(Pop)(t) in Table 7 for the English speaking population
at the years 1150, 1657 and 1989 and η(Lex)(t) for the English lexicon at the
years 1150, 1657 and 1989. Using this information, we are now in a position to
calculate an estimate of (
d|{PSInnate(t)}|
dt
)
Av
. (119)
Since
d|{PSSociety}|
dt
= 3.41% (120)
per decade is an average rate over time, the two factors η(Pop(t)) and η(|Lex(t)|)
must also be averages for the period over which the rate is calculated. To
calculate the product of η(Pop)× η(Lex) for a time period t1 to t2, we need to
calculate, for network X ,
η(X(t1)) + η(X(t2))
2
, (121)
for each of the population and the lexical networks, during the relevant period
to get the average applicable values of η. We take the average of the logarithmic
functions since C logS(n) changes proportionally with time. Using the results
about η from Table 7, we obtain average values as set out in Table 8.
t1 t2 Average η(Pop) Average η(Lex) Product of 2 averaged ηs
1150 1989 10.47 5.29 55.37
1657 1989 10.72 5.68 60.94
Table 8: Calculation of average values of ηs and their products, for 1150–1989
and 1657–1989.
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Using the data in Table 8, we can find(
d|{PSInnate(t)}|
dt
)
Av
, (122)
by solving for it using (116), as follows:
(
d|{PSInnate(t)}|
dt
)
Av
=
(
d|{PSSociety(t)}|
dt
)
Av
÷ {η([Pop(t)]Av)× η(|Lex(t)|Av)}
= 3.41%/ decade
÷ {η([Pop(t)]Av)× η(|Lex(t)|Av)} .
(123)
We use the value in subsection 5.4 for the average collective problem solving
rate
d|{PSSociety}|
dt
, 3.41% per decade, and the product of the averaged values for
η(N(t)) in Table 8 for the periods 1150–1989 and 1657–1989, to calculate the
average innate problem solving rate set out in Table 9. In using the product
of the averaged values for η(N(t)) in Table 8, the size of the English lexicon at
1150 may be understated, and thus may result in a slight under-calculation of
η(N(1150)). If η(N(1150)) calculated for the English lexicon is slightly lower
than its actual value, that would result in a too high general collective problem
solving rate for the period 1150–1989. The estimate based on the average η
values for population and lexicon for the period 1657–1989, and using the rate
of increase in society’s problem solving rate as 3.41% per decade, is 5.60% per
thousand years.
t1 t2
d[PSAverage Innate(t)]
dt
1150 1989 6.16% per 1000 yrs
1657 1989 5.60% per 1000 yrs
Table 9: Calculation of the average innate problem solving rate, based on an
average general collective problem solving rate of 3.41% per decade
7.4.1 Comparing values of η
The product of η(Pop(1989)) and η(|Lex(1989)|) for the English speaking pop-
ulation and for the English lexicon, using the values in Table 7 is 12× 5.932 =
71.21. The average innate, or basal, problem solving capacity of an individ-
ual in English speaking society was multiplied 71.21 times compared to what
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the average innate problem solving rate would be without any social network-
ing at all, not even with parents, and without any language at all, not even
animal-like sounds or gestures. Instead of comparing the average problem solv-
ing rate of a modern individual to a person bereft of parents and language,
let’s use as a basis for comparison a physiologically modern person living in a
primitive society of 150 individuals with 100 vocalizations. If we use modern
values of C and S for η(Pop) for the primitive population and for η(|Lex|)
for their lexicon, we find η(Pop) = 3.057 and η(|Lex|) = 2.049; the η prod-
uct of η(Pop = 150) × η(|Lex = 100|) is 6.265. The product of η(Pop(1989))
and η(|Lex(1989)|) is 11.37 times larger than the η product, 6.265, of the 150
member society with 100 vocalizations. We can consider the η product for the
primitive society, 6.265, to approximately represent the capacity multiplier for
individuals in a ‘primitive’ society of physiologically modern humans. If the
lexicon had 10,000 words, then η(|Lex|) = 4.098 and the η product for the
same size society of 150 individuals would be 12.53, twice as much. Language
multiplies the problem solving capacity of human beings.
To get a sense of the difference that large-scale social networking and a large
network of solved problems makes in developing individual intelligence, consider
that the η -value of the human brain, as set out in Table 7, 14.71, is 9.08 times
that of the η-value in Table 7 of the neural system of the worm C elegans, which
is less than the 11.37 times difference between a modern society’s capacity mul-
tiplier for a physiologically modern person compared to a a primitive society’s
capacity multiplier for a physiologically modern person living in a primitive
society. There was more difference between the problem solving capacity mul-
tiplier of English speaking society in 1989, considered as a single mind, and the
problem solving capacity multiplier of a primitive society of 150 people with
only 100 words, than there is between the brain of an average human being and
the nervous system of the worm, C. elegans.
This third set of data is consistent with what we know about human nature
and human capacities, but it is not proof of The General Collective Problem
Solving Capacity Hypothesis.
7.5 Glottochronology
The fourth set of data also relates to the average innate, or basal, problem
solving capacity of an individual. We have just found estimates, set out in
Table 9, of the average innate problem solving rate. Using a second, entirely
different method, using entirely different data, we estimate the average innate,
or basal, problem solving rate of a modern human being. We then compare
the two differently obtained estimates of the average innate, or basal, problem
solving capacity of a human being.
In the 1940s, the linguists Morris Swadesh and Robert Lees devised a way to
estimate how long ago two related languages first diverged. The method is called
glottochronology. The method used in glottochronology was this. Swadesh
chose 100 words (the ‘Basic List’) that he thought were least likely to change
in a language; it is not possible to study the historical usage of words over a
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long period of time if the words only appeared in the language for a few years.
Swadesh studied actual recorded historical uses of cognates (related words) on
the Basic List, for two related languages. Swadesh measured the rate of retention
of cognates in related languages by counting the current number of Basic List
words they still shared: “a maximum retention of 90 percent after a thousand
years, a minimum of 81 percent, and an average of 86 percent” [56, p. 276]. If we
convert the rate of retention to a rate of divergence, then Swadesh’s estimated
rate of divergence ranged from 10% to 19% per thousand years, an average of
14% per thousand years. Using the rate of divergence of the words on the Basic
List, one can estimate the date of the common ancestral language.
Using his idea, glottochronology, Swadesh estimated that English’s ancestral
language began “at least seven thousand years before the present,” [56, p. 84],
probably using the average rate of divergence that he calculated. His book was
published posthumously; the ‘present’ was about 1966. Swadesh did his work
before the advent of the personal computer. In 2003, 37 years later after his 1966
estimate of the age of English’s ancestral language of “at least seven thousand
years before the present,” Russell D. Gray and Quentin D. Atkinson estimated
that Indo-European (English’s ancestral language) began 8700 years ago, using
newer, more sophisticated methods [23]. To adjust Swadesh’s estimated 14%
rate of divergence using Gray and Atkinson’s more recent and comprehensive
estimate, we need to adjust Swadesh’s estimated average rate of language di-
vergence, 14% per thousand years, so that the adjusted rate of divergence dates
Indo-European to 8700 years before Gray and Atkinson’s article. To do so, we
multiply 14% per thousand years by 7037/8700, for an Adjusted Swadesh Rate
of divergence of 11.32% per thousand years, as in
7037
8700
× 14% = 11.32%. (124)
We now examine the relationship of the Adjusted Swadesh Rate of divergence
of two related languages to the average innate problem solving rate. Suppose
that two daughter languages share a common ancestral language with a lexicon
LexAnc. Let LexD1 represent the lexicon of the first daughter language and
LexD2 represent the lexicon of the second daughter language. Suppose the
common ancestral language LexAnc has a general collective problem solving rate
R. At the time immediately before the two daughter languages begin to diverge
from their common ancestral language, the general collective problem solving
rate for each is the same, namely R, and their lexicons, LexD1 and LexD2,
are identical to LexAnc. After the societies speaking the daughter languages
have separated, each daughter society independently applies the same general
collective problem solving rate, R, to devise lexical solutions—different lexical
solutions due to the physical, cultural and other divergences of the daughter
societies—to its language problems. To keep the analysis uncomplicated, we
suppose that the number of words in the daughter languages remains the same
as in the ancestral language, unchanged throughout the period of divergence.
Each daughter language diverges—grows away—from the ancestral language at
the same rate, m, say, a percentage rate per thousand years. If the two daughter
A theory of intelligence 70
societies find different solutions for language problems, then on average they
diverge from each other at the rate 2m, like the equal sides of an isosceles
triangle diverging from the common vertex.
Half the modified 11.32% per thousand years of the Adjusted Swadesh Rate,
is 5.66% per thousand years.
The 5.66% per thousand years using Swadesh’s glottochronology is remark-
ably close to the value calculated for the innate, or basal, problem solving rate
in Table 9, 5.60% per thousand years, using data for an English speaking so-
ciety for the period 1657 to 1989, the formula (56) and the average general
collective problem solving rate of 3.41% per decade. Since the data for 1657
is likely somewhat more reliable than our data for 1150 (the estimated English
lexical growth rate for 1657–1989 is closer to the benchmark rate of increase
in lighting efficiency than the estimated average English lexical growth rate for
1159–1989), the estimate of the average innate, or basal, problem solving rate
for the period 1657–1989 is somewhat more reliable than our estimate of that
rate for the period 1150–1989. It seems that the estimates of the average innate,
or basal, problem solving rate in Table 9 is measuring half the rate of divergence
of two related languages.
Both methods—using glottochronology and using the formula (56)—so dif-
ferent from each other, give us estimates that are about the same for the average
innate, or basal, problem solving rate of modern human beings. The numerical
correspondence implies that the two different methods have measured the same
phenomenon.
This numerical correspondence, however, was obtained in a way that seems
to contain an inconsistency. We supposed that the common ancestral language,
and therefore each of the two daughter languages, had the same general collec-
tive problem solving rate R. We inferred that the daughter languages diverge
at twice their individual rate of divergence from the now fossilized ancestral
language. But if each daughter language changes at the rate R, shouldn’t 2m
= 2R? If so, then the rate of divergence would be twice 3.41% per decade, that
is 6.82% per decade, instead of the calculated 5.66% (or so) per thousand years.
Let’s call this the ‘Divergence Rate Problem.’
To resolve this apparent inconsistency, we require the Capacity Multiplier
Theorem in subsection 6.3. In the discussion about that theorem we observed
that the average innate, or basal, problem solving rate is unchanging. The
reason why the Network Rate is a multiple of the innate, or basal, problem
solving rate is because the innate, or basal, problem solving rate is applied to η
cluster generations of solved problems.
Let ηAnc here denote the product of η(Pop) and η(|Lex|) for the ancestral
language. Let m denote the average innate, or basal, problem solving rate.
The number of word problems the society in which the ancestral language was
spoken is equal to the average problem solving rate m × η which is applied
to the existing number of solved lexical problems. That is, m is applied so
that we have m × η × |Lex|. The Capacity Multiplier Theorem stipulates that
really it is the innate, or basal, problem solving rate that is applied to the
networked set of society’s lexical problems. The target of the ancestral society’s
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and a daughter society’s problem solving capacity is the same scaled number of
problems, η × |Lex|.
When the two daughter languages begin to diverge from each other, the
ancestral language, now no longer spoken, has ceased changing. For the un-
changing ancestral language, mAnc = 0. But for the daughter languages, the
value of mD1 = mD2 = m. To find the number of changes in a daughter lan-
guage such as LexD1 compared to the now unchanging ancestral language, we
adapt the equation relating to solved problems set out in (16) to the situation
of a changing lexicon as follows:
|LexD1(t1)| =
{
(1 +m)∆t
}
× η × |LexD1(t0)|. (125)
Now we examine one period of time, so ∆t = 1 at the beginning of divergence,
when LexD1(t0) = LexAnc(t0). Since we are comparing the unchanging ancestor
language at (t0) to the changing daughter language, mAnc = 0 for this purpose.
We then take the ratio
|LexD1(t1)|
|LexAnc(t1)|
=
{
(1 +mD1)
∆t
}
× η × |LexD1(t0)|
{(1 +mAnc)∆t} × η × |LexAnc(t0)|
=
{
(1 +mD1)
1
}
× |LexD1(t0)|
{(1 + 0)1} × |LexAnc(t0)|
= 1 +mD1
= 1 +m
(126)
because |LexD1(t0)| = |LexAnc(t0)| and ηD1(t0) = ηAnc(t0). The last line in
(126) gives us the average innate problem solving ratem in 1+m. Glottochronol-
ogy indirectly measures the innate, or basal, problem solving rate—the average
rate of divergence of two daughter languages is twice the average innate problem
solving rate—because the innate problem solving rate is applied to η times the
number of solved lexical problems both for a daughter language and its ancestral
language.
Since the innate problem solving rate is almost the same when calculated
using the formula for the entropy of a network and when determined using
glottochronology, we conclude
1. The validity of The General Network Rate Theorem is consistent with this
concurrence.
2. The General Network Rate Theorem can be applied to perform actual
calculations for networks.
3. The Capacity Multiplier Theorem is required to explain the concurrence of
half the average rate of divergence for two related language as determined
using glottochronology with the average innate, or basal, problem solving
rate as determined using the concept of a network’s entropy.
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4. Despite various shortcomings that have been identified in glottochronol-
ogy’s methodology [5, p. 311] and [10, p. 204 and 205], in principle,
glottochronology indirectly measures the average innate, or basal, prob-
lem solving rate (by measuring twice the innate, or basal, problem solving
rate). The underlying concepts and methods of glottochronology are, in
principle, valid.
When, in 2007, I first attempted to resolve the Divergence Rate Problem, I
assumed that η×m applied to the lexicon. That, in addition to some erroneous
data, calculations and assumptions, led me to erroneously infer that there was
a 4:1 ratio instead of the actual 2:1 ratio between the rate of divergence for
daughter languages as compared to the innate rate.
To the observation of such a close correspondence between 5.66% per thou-
sand years, which is half the 11.32% per thousand years of the Adjusted Swadesh
Rate of divergence of two related languages, and the 5.6% per thousand years
calculated using η and the data above, one can adopt an 1850 remark of R.
Clausius about a result in thermodynamics:
“Such an agreement between results which are obtained from en-
tirely different principles cannot be accidental; it rather serves as a
powerful confirmation of the two principles and the first subsidiary
hypothesis annexed to them [11].”
The fourth set of data is consistent, and (I would submit) confirmatory. If
so, Swadesh’s glottochronology should be recognized for its role not only in
linguistics but as an independent means of indirectly measuring and verifying
society’s average general collective problem solving rate.
7.6 When language began
The results concerning glottochronology can be generalized. Using the average
innate, or basal, rate of growth for a system (not just a lexicon), it is possible
to estimate the age of the system. The average innate, or basal, rate, m, can be
used to find the length of time between the current system and its commence-
ment, if we assume that at its commencement, η = 1. We can do this by finding
how long it would take, going back in time, for a system with N(t2) nodes to
reach an ancestor system of N(t1) = S nodes, at the rate m. We assume that
when N(t1) = S, then η = 1. This ‘entropy’ dating method should be valid if
the rate at which the entropy η of the system changes is proportional to time.
It must be appropriate to assume that the energy supply has been constant
during the time when the daughter system diverged from the parent system;
if the system’s energy supply—energy input—has been constant, then we may
infer that the system’s output should be constant as well, proportional to the
energy input. We use m as the rate in the equation (17). Instead of solving for
the rate r in (17), as we did in (18), we solve for t1 in (17).
Changing (17) slightly, we have ,
N(t2) = N(t1) exp(m · (t2 − t1)), (127)
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where t2 represents the current year, N(t2) represents the number of nodes in
the system at t2, m represents the basal rate of change, and the starting year
t1 is unknown. In (127), N(t1) represents the size of the system at the year t1.
Solving (127) for t1 gives
t1 = t2 −
[{
log
(
N(t2)
N(t1)
)}
÷m
]
. (128)
In (128), the expression
[{
log
(
N(t2)
N(t1)
)}
÷m
]
(129)
gives the number of years before t2.
This can be described as follows.
The Basal Rate Network Dating Theorem. Suppose the innate, or basal
rate, of growth in a network, m, is known. If t2 represents a later year, N(t2)
represents the number of nodes in the network at t2, and the unknown sought to
be determined is an earlier year t1, when it is estimated the network had N(t1)
nodes, then if m is assumed to be constant for the period from t1 to t2,
t1 = t2 −
[{
log
(
N(t2)
N(t1)
)}
÷m
]
. (130)
Using The Basal Rate Network Dating Theorem, and the estimated average
innate, or basal, problem solving rate, we can attempt to create a fifth set of
data that estimates when language began. The average innate, or basal, problem
solving rate, 5.66% per thousand years, based on the Adjusted Swadesh estimate
of the divergence rate for two related languages, is preferred because it is so close
to the 5.60% rate set out in Table 9, determined using the General Network Rate
Theorem. For comparison purposes, I have also set out calculations using the
less likely 6.16% per thousand year rate in Table 9. Two assumptions about the
number of words at the beginning of language are possible. In one approach, we
could assume that there was one word at the beginning of language, N(t1) = 1.
But primates and other animals have vocalizations which, while they may not
be words as we think of them, communicate information. It may be more
conservative to assume that at the outset of language, the precursors of modern
human beings had some vocalizations, which I here assume to be 100, that is,
N(t1) = 100. I have shown both assumptions in Table 10. Table 10 sets out
estimates of when language began showing the two different assumptions, with
one column headed by N(t1) = 1 and the other by N(t1) = 100, and using, at
the left, two different values, obtained for the average innate problem solving
rate, which are in Table 9.
Estimating the start date of language is difficult because writing probably
only began about 3500 B.C.E. [52]. Speech leaves no records. A striking obser-
vation based on the data in Table 10 is the difference in the estimated starting
date for language, depending on which of the two assumptions applies, N(t1) = 1
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Innate rate per 1000 years Years before 1989
Source Rate N(t1) = 1 N(t1) = 100
Adjusted Swadesh 5.66% 235,544 154,181
English 1150–1989 6.16% 216,425 141,666
Table 10: Estimating when language began based on the innate problem solving
rate
or N(t1) = 100. This may be taken to be indicative of how long it would take
to build from one word to a 100 word lexicon at the estimated average general
innate problem solving rate of about 5.66% per thousand years—over 70,000
years—an indication of the amount of energy and time required to identify and
solve new problems, or to discover new ideas. If the calculations—as opposed
to the estimates—in Table 10 are accurate, they likely underestimate the age of
language, because we have assumed that the average innate, or basal, problem
solving rate was at all times constant. It is not unlikely that 150,000 years
ago or more, the average innate problem solving rate was somewhat less than
the current average innate problem solving rate because the human brain had
a smaller physiological capacity, which would suggest the development of lan-
guage would have taken somewhat longer than the estimates calculated in Table
10.
Mark Pagel did a study in which he calculated that seven slowly evolving
words have half lives estimated at 166,000 years: I, we, who, two, three, four, five
[44, p. 205]. He remarks that “These figures . . . should not be taken literally”,
but his results are not inconsistent with the estimates in Table 10.
The estimates in Table 10, a speculative exercise, are plausible, and perhaps
indicative of when language began, but there is no current data on language to
corroborate them, though paleontological evidence is not inconsistent with such
estimates. For example, human cooperative hunting seems to have begun about
500,000 years ago [12, pp. 393–401]. This data gives no proof of The General
Collective Problem Solving Capacity Hypothesis.
If The Basal Rate Network Dating Theorem can be applied to date a process,
such as evolution of an organism or of a structure in an organism, or of an
economy, that permits the date to be corroborated, that would help support
the validity of the ideas in this article. For example, can the time when the first
neurons began be estimated—taking the number of neurons in a human brain at
time t2 and comparing that to one third the number of neurons in an ancestor
when the brain was one third the size—using ‘entropy dating’ and comparing
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the results, calculated for an earlier time, to paleontological evidence?
7.7 U.S. economic growth rate
The sixth set of data concern an economic calculation. Earlier, in (78), we
estimated that society’s average collective problem solving rate—the rate of in-
crease in society’s store of solved problems—is 3.41% per decade. We also found
that the average individual problem solving rate is the same as society’s aver-
age collective problem solving rate. The average U.S. 8 (for example) economic
growth rate from 1880 to 1980—the rate of increase in society’s store of material
wealth—is much higher than 3.41% per decade. Is this Economic Growth Rate
Problem inconsistent with the results this far?
Assume that economic productivity per person benefits from economic net-
working. For a society with language and technology, suppose that the economic
productivity of an individual in a society results from the individual’s problem
solving capacity and networking with all people participating in the economic
productivity of that society. Let
d(EcPr(t))
dt
(131)
represent the growth rate of productivity in an economy, η(Pop) the entropy
of the economy’s population, and (LP ) the economy’s labor participation rate.
We infer the following:
d(EcPr(t))
dt
=
(
d|{PSIndividual}|
dt
)
Av
× [η(Pop)]Av × (LP )Av. (132)
We can use (132) to estimate the rate of economic growth for the United
States from 1880 to 1980. To do so, we will use the following additional data:
• In 1880, the U.S. Census Office counted 50,155,783 people [69, Table Ia].
η(50, 155, 783) = 10.818657, using the values for C and S found for the
225,226 IMDB actors in [59].
• In 1980, the U.S. Census Bureau counted 226,545,805 people [70, Table
72]. η(226, 545, 805) = 11.738675, again using the values for C and S
found for the 225,226 IMDB actors in [59].
• For 2004–2005, the U.S. labor participation rate was an estimated 66%
[37]. We will assume this percentage applied in both 1880 and 1980. (It
was estimated to have peaked at 67.1% in the late 1990s [37].)
• The average of the two η values for the U.S. population, for 1880 and
1980, is 11.485141.
8An ‘open’ society such as the United States may be considered to provide simpler data
for these purposes.
A theory of intelligence 76
Using the average η for population, and calculating using (132),
d(EcPr(t))
dt
=
(
d|{PSIndividual}|
dt
)
Av
× [η(Pop)]Av × (LP )Av
= 3.41% per decade× 11.485141× 0.66
= 2.53% per year
(133)
In fact, productivity per hour increased in the United States about 10 times
over a 100 years up to about 1980, an average rate of about 2.3% per year [48].
The networked productivity growth rate, 2.53% per year, calculated using
(131) is 10.36% higher than the 2.3% per year based on [48]. The discrepancy
could result from the 10 times increase being only approximate, from inaccurate
data or methodology, or from a missing factor represented by the function h—
the infrastructure function—described in connection with (81), or could reflect
some inefficiency in the market. The discrepancy could result from the informal
economy. The informal labor force in Los Angeles County in 2004, based on the
midpoint of a range of estimates, is 15% [58]. A world bank study estimated
the informal economy in 2000 in the U.S. at 8.8% and in Canada 16.4% [53], so
it is possible that the discrepancy of 10.36% indirectly measures the informal
economy. The short duration used to estimate the average rate of productivity
growth may result in some uncertainty in the estimate; measurement over a 100
year period has more uncertainty than measurement over a longer period, as
shown in Tables 1 and 2. In any event, (132) seems to address, at least partly,
the Economic Growth Rate Problem. This result is consistent with the results
thus far, but not proof of The General Collective Problem Solving Capacity
Hypothesis.
7.7.1 Economic Productivity Theorem
From (132)
d(EcPr(t))
dt
∝
(
d|{PSIndividual}|
dt
)
Av
× [η(Pop)]Av . (134)
Based on (59),
(
d|{PSIndividual}|
dt
)
Av
∝ [C(PSSoc)]Av × log[S−PS](Av)(|{PSSociety}|)
× [C(Pop)]Av × log[S−Pop](Av)(Pop),
(135)
or, more succinctly,
(
d|{PSIndividual}|
dt
)
Av
∝ [η(|{PSSociety}|)]Av × [η(Pop)]Av . (136)
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If we substitute the right side of (136) into (134) for the factor(
d|{PSIndividual}|
dt
)
Av
, (137)
we obtain
d(EcPr(t))
dt
∝ (η(|{PSSociety}|)Av × η(Pop))Av × [η(Pop)]Av , (138)
and so, in general terms (leaving out the ‘Av’ subscripts),
d(EcPr)
dt
∝ {η(Pop)}2 × η(| {PSSociety} |). (139)
This is an
Economic Productivity Theorem. Economic productivity is proportional
to the square of the entropy of a society’s population times the entropy of the
number of the society’s solved problems.
The Economic Productivity Theorem implies that impairing the capacity of a
society’s members to freely network and exchange ideas can reduce the value of
the product on the right side of (139). The benefit of networking is increased—
η(Pop) is increased—when all of society’s members can freely exchange solved
problems. Since η(Pop) by itself can affect the capacity of individuals and of a
society, and therefor economic productivity, the value of [η(Pop)]2 in relation to
a society’s economic growth is greater than that. If the freedom of a population
to socially and economically network is impaired, then likely, for η(Pop), C, the
clustering coefficient, is smaller, and S is larger, both reducing [η(Pop)]2, with
deleterious effects on potential economic growth. (139) implies that there also
may be an adverse effect on economic growth if C and S are impaired in the
formula for η|{(PS)}| for a society’s network of abstractions.
The promotion during The Enlightenment of economic, political and philo-
sophical freedom appears to be consistent with the consequences that such free-
doms have for economic productivity. Spinoza wrote many years ago that
“Finally, we have shown not only that this freedom [the freedom
to say what they think] can be granted without detriment to public
peace, to piety, and to the right of the sovereign, but also that it
must be granted if these are to be preserved” [55, Ch. 20, p 572].
7.8 Increases in life expectancy
The seventh set of data relate to the observation of increasing life expectancies
in the world since 1840. Suppose better public health ideas began to circulate in
the 1800s. Individuals evaluate life style choices affecting health—what to eat,
whether to exercise, and what other individual lifestyle choices to make—that
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can affect an individual’s longevity. The data suggests that there is no extra
η(Pop) factor as there is in the case of economic productivity, likely because the
evaluation of lifestyle choices is largely for oneself. Does life expectancy increase
at the average individual problem solving rate?
The data set out in Table 11 is excerpted from [43] which contains material
supplementary to an article by Jim Oeppen and James W. Vaupel [42] about
life expectancies. I chose data from [43] for people of the same sex and country
at different times. L.E. in Table 11 represents life expectancy for the year to
the adjacent left of the L.E. column. The last column sets out the percentage
by which the rate of growth per decade in life expectancy exceeds 3.41% per
decade.
Country M-F t1 L.E. t2 L.E. Rate/dec cf. 3.41%
Norway F 1841 47.9 1970 77.32 3.71% +8.85%
Norway M 1841 44.5 1960 71.39 3.97% +16.48%
New Zealand M 1876 51.99 1944 66.58 3.63% +6.672%
Denmark M 1840 43.11 1919 56.69 3.46% +1.652%
Table 11: Increases in human longevity, from [43]
From Table 11, the rates of increase in longevity for the periods considered
are close to the 3.41% that appears to be society’s long-term average general
problem solving rate, but higher as set out in the column in Table 11 headed ‘cf.
3.41%.’ The discrepancies in rates may be due to the function h, the infrastruc-
ture factor mentioned in (81). The discrepancy may arise because measurement
over a period of about 100 years as in Table 11 has more uncertainty than mea-
surement over a longer period, recalling the error analysis set out in Tables 1
and 2.
In connection with their study, Oeppen and James W. Vaupel write,
“The linear climb of record life expectancy suggests that reductions
in mortality should not be seen as a disconnected sequence of un-
repeatable revolutions but rather as a regular stream of continuing
progress [42].”
The ‘regular stream of continuing progress’ is, likely, largely due to the
increase in society’s average general collective problem solving rate, equal to the
increase in the average general individual problem solving rate. These results
are consistent with, but not proof of, The General Collective Problem Solving
Capacity Hypothesis. The rate of increase in life expectancy is consistent with
(78).
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8 Conclusion
Together, the seven sets of data set out above, and particularly the calculations
relating to the average innate, basal, or bi-nodal rate and glottochronology,
support the concepts and equations described in this article.
This article likely raises more questions than it answers, including the prob-
lem of discovering other problems to which these ideas might be applied. It
seems to me that a particularly promising area of inquiry is economics because
of the availability of economic statistics. It may be that some of these ideas
may also be helpful in epidemiology, and in educational issues.
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